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The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and
conscience of every man; and it is the rightof every man to exercise
it as these may dictate. This right is in its nature an unalienable
right.
- James Madison'

I. INTRODUCTION

Reconciling faith within the American workplace has had a difficult
history,2 and an especially contentious future looms ahead. Religious
1. JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS

(1785), reprintedin THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES
MADISON 7 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981) (1973).
2. See, e.g., Charles C. Haynes, Religious Discriminationin Workplace on Rise in U.S.,
HERALD-DISPATCH (W. Va.), Sept. 25, 2003, at 8A (discussing a rise in the number of claims to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging workplace religious
discrimination). Data compiled by the EEOC revealed that the number of claims alleging religious
discrimination increased by more than 50% between 1992 and 2003. See U.S. EQUALEMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

RELIGION-BASED CHARGES: FY 1992 - 2003, available at

http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/religion.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005). Claims alleging racial
discrimination, however, dropped by 3.5% during the same period. See id.; Richard T. Foltin &
James D. Standish, Reconciling FaithandLivelihood: Religion in the Workplace and Title VII, 31
HUM. RTS., Summer 2004, at 19, 19.
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accommodation in the workplace recently garnered national - albeit
dubious - attention in July 2004 when the Virginia Legislature sought to
erase antiquated laws dating back to the House of Burgesses3 from the
Virginia Code.4 Although the enacted bill5 formally abolished the state's
Blue Laws,6 the Virginia Legislature accidentally and unintentionally
revived a "day ofrest" law that enabled employees to refrain from working
on Sundays and eliminated statutory protections for businesses.7 Virginia,
therefore, served as a paradigm for how not to enact workplace religious
accommodation provisions.8 As a special legislative session convened in
Richmond to correct the oversight, a vigorous campaign in Washington 9

3. The Virginia House of Burgesses, the oldest legislative body on American soil, first
convened at Jamestown in 1619. Strand Amusement Co. v. Commonwealth, 43 S.W.2d 321, 322
(Ky. 1931).
4. Louis Hansen, Blue Laws, Long Disused, Come Off the Books, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb.
25, 2004, at A16.
5. S.B. 659, 2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2004). The bill eliminated antiquated
provisions that prohibited businesses from remaining open on Sundays. Michael D. Shear, Va.
ErrorReinstates Blue Laws, WASH. POST, July 2, 2004, at Al. Three code provisions, which
provided for observance of Saturday Sabbaths, restrictions on work or transacting business on
Sundays, and application of these restrictions to particular cities and counties, had already been
declared unconstitutional by the Virginia Supreme Court sixteen years prior but remained part of
the code for historical purposes. See Benderson Dev. Co. v. Sciortino, 372 S.E.2d 751, 759 (Va.
1988); Hansen, supra note 4. Senate Bill 659 additionally repealed Virginia Code provisions that
classified an employer's failure to grant an employee twenty-four consecutive hours of rest as a
misdemeanor punishable by treble the amount of the employee's wages. See Virginia Blue Law,
WASH. POST, July 3, 2004, at B5 (reprinting excerpts of the repealed provisions from the Virginia
Code).
6. Blue Laws, which prohibited a large number of businesses from opening on Saturdays,
were named after the color of the legal paper used to draft them in the eighteenth century. See
Hansen, supra note 4; Christina Nuckols, Accidental 'Day of Rest' Law Won 't Be Enforced
Yet/Injunction Issued: Lawmakers Told To Fix Own Mistake, VRGINIAN-PILOT, July 3, 2004, at
Al.
7. See Shear, supra note 5; Nuckols, supra note 6.
8. Virginia's law "went too far" because it required an employer to grant its employees time
off from work regardless of the difficulties or expenses it incurred for providing such
accommodations. Richard T. Foltin, Benefits of Virginia'sBlue Law, WASH. POST, July 14, 2004,
at Al8.
9. Formed to enact the Workplace Religious Freedom Act of2003, S. 893, 108th Cong. (1st
Sess. 2003), the Coalition for Religious Freedom in the Workplace is comprised of over forty
diverse, religious organizations spanning the entire political spectrum. See 149 CONG. REC. S535253 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum); see also Charles C. Haynes, Religion
in the Workplace, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 28, 2003, at G5; Memorandum from the Coalition for
Religious Freedom in the Workplace, to Interested Parties 13 (June 30,2004) (on file with author)
[hereinafter WRFA Coalition Memo].
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to reconcile the needs of people of faith in the workplace garnered greater
attention nationwide.' 0
This Note focuses upon the latest effort to enact the Workplace
Religious Freedom Act of 20031 (WRFA), legislation designed to
"resolve conflicts between job requirements and employee religious
expression." 2 Part II analyzes the legislative history behind and enactment
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and traces the subsequent
incorporation of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship
provisions into title VII. Part Ell examines the U.S. Supreme Court's
treatment of religious accommodation cases under title VII and the
ramifications of its decisions. In anticipation of the analysis provided in
the subsequent section, Part IV recounts numerous congressional attempts
to pass the WRFA in different forms and discusses the substantive
provisions of the current bill. Part V addresses four specific concerns
advanced by opponents of the WRFA and analyzes cases decided under
the current legal standard to determine whether the rights of third parties
will be adversely affected by enacting the WRFA. This Note concludes
that third parties' rights will not be negatively impacted under the WRFA
and emphasizes that the legal analysis courts currently employ would not
vary once the legislation becomes law. This Note therefore recommends
that the WRFA, which strikes an appropriate balance between an
employee's religious observances and workplace obligations to the
employer, be enacted to ensure that no American will "be arbitrarily forced
to choose between faith and an honest living."' 3 Since the tragic events of
September 11, 2001, thousands of Americans have been subject to an
increase in discrimination in the workplace on the basis of their religion, 4

10. See Eliot Spitzer, Both Sides: Defend the Civil Right to Freedom of Religion for
America 's Workers, FORWARD, June 25, 2004, at 1, 7; see also Foltin & Standish, supra note 2,
at 19.
11. The Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003 was introduced by Sen. Rick Santorum
ofPennsylvania on April 11,2003. 149 CONG. REc. S5352-53 (daily ed. Apr. 11,2003) (statement
of Sen. Santorum). For the entire text of the bill, see infranote 139.
12. Thomas D. Brierton, 'ReasonableAccommodation' Under Title VII: Is it Reasonableto
the Religious Employee? 42 CATH. LAW. 165, 165 (2002).

13. Richard T. Foltin & James D. Standish, Your Job or Your Faith? Under the Workplace
ReligiousFreedom Act, Americans WouldNot Have to Choose, LEGAL TIMES, July 21, 2003, at 36.
14. Since the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks, courts have witnessed a "significant recent
upswing" in the number of cases brought by Muslim Americans and Sikh Americans. Foltin &
Standish, supra note 2, at 19; see also 148 CONG. REc. S4865 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Kerry) (stating that "after September 11[, 2001], with a heightened sense of religious
sensitivity among the American people, securing greater protections for the religious needs of
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thereby making the need to protect Americans' religious freedom
especially urgent.
I. TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 196415

Congress enacted title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to promote
equal employment opportunities and eliminate discrimination in the
workplace based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.16 As
originally enacted, title VII provided no specific definitions of race, color,
sex, or national origin.' 7 Additionally, title VU did not clarify whether
religion encompassed some or all aspects of religious observance, practice,
beliefs, or a combination thereof 1 As a result, ambiguities arose as to
whether employers 9 engaged in religious discrimination against
employees who expressed individualized and specific religious needs."
A. Incorporating"ReasonableAccommodation " into Title VII
Title VIl's omission of a definition for the term "religion" 21 was even
more problematic since the Civil Rights Act's silence provided no
guidance for resolving disputes between employers and employees based
upon religion. 2 Two years after the passage of title VII, the Equal

employees is a major issue"); John Elvin, Insight, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, at 16 (noting
that religious discrimination in the workplace dramatically increased after September 11, 2001);
Charles C. Haynes, Religion in the Workplace, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 28, 2003, at G5 (stating that
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has received "hundreds" of complaints
from American Muslims and those individuals mistaken for Muslims alleging workplace
discrimination since September 11, 2001).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2004)).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 703(a)(1) (2004).
17. Id. § 701.
18. Id.
19. Title VII originally defined an employer as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty-five or more employees." Id. § 701(b). The number was subsequently
reduced to fifteen in order to apply the statute to a wider array of employers. Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2004)).
20. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605. l(a)(1) (1967)
(codifying the 1966 Guidelines); Kaminer, infra note 28 and accompanying text.
21. See supra text accompanying note 18.
22. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-705, 78 Stat. 241, 253-58 (1964)
(codified as amended in scattered sections at 42 U.S.C. (2004)).
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Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)23 issued guidelines
addressing whether an employer's discharge of an employee whose
religious observances necessitated time away from work during the regular
workweek constituted discrimination under title VII.24 The EEOC
concluded that "[a]n employer . . . should make a reasonable
accommodation to the needs of his employees . . .in connection with

special religious holiday observances."25 Employers were further
instructed to "attempt to achieve an accommodation so as to avoid a
conflict" for employees whose previous work schedules required alteration
due to religious obligations.26
Courts soon encountered cases27 questioning whether title VII "merely
prohibited" religious discrimination or whether employers had an
affirmative obligation to accommodate a religious employee.28 Responding
to the judiciary's reluctance to confer full legal weight upon the EEOC
guidelines,29 Senator Jennings Randolph introduced legislation3 ° codifying
"reasonable accommodation" provisions into title VII in 1971.31 Senator

23. Section 705 oftitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 established the EEOC, which was
charged with the power, inter alia,to investigate alleged unlawful employment practices. § 706(a).
Upon a determination that reasonable cause exists to believe that an alleged unlawful employment
practice occurred, the Commission "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." Id.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(a)(1) (1966).
25. Id. § 1605.1(b)(2) (emphasis added).
26. Id. § 1605.1(b)(4). For a further discussion and analysis of the EEOC guidelines and
subsequent amendments, see Brierton, supra note 12, at 167-69.
27. See infra text accompanying note 32.
28. Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII's Failureto ProvideMeaningful andConsistentProtection
of Religious Employees: Proposalsfor an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575, 580
(2000).
29. Numerous cases emphasized that EEOC guidelines were not binding upon the judiciary.
See, e.g., Bartmess v. Drewrys U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186, 1190 (7th Cir. 1971) (stating that
EEOC guidelines do not "have the force of law"); Hicks v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 319 F. Supp.
314, 319 (E.D. La. 1970) (finding that EEOC guidelines "are not binding" upon the court); Grimm
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 984,989 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (noting that "the proposition
that EEOC determinations are not legally binding has received judicial affirmation"); Am.
Newspaper Publ'g Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 (D.D.C. 1968) (concluding that
the EEOC guideline "is not a regulation having the force or effect of law.., the Guideline is not
binding upon the court").
30. The Equal Employment Opportunities Act of 1971 clarified that religion "includes all
aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that
he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's. . . religious observance or practice."
118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972).
31. Id. Senator Randolph stated that, despite the fact that the Founding Fathers deemed
freedom from religious discrimination a fundamental right, "courts have on occasion determined
that this freedom is nebulous." Id. In fact, one month after Senator Randolph's bill passed by a vote
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Randolph maintained that judicial decisions "clouded" the original intent
of title VII and emphasized that the U.S. Supreme Court was equally
divided over the question of employment discrimination as it pertained to
Sabbath religious-observance.32 By enacting an amendment to title VII that
prescribed a flexible approach for employers and employees to reconcile
religious observance with workplace requirements, Congress sought to
encourage an open dialogue between both parties as a means of reaching
an appropriate resolution.33 As enacted by unanimous vote in 1972, the
amendment to title VII defined religion as including "all aspects of
religious observance and practice," and it imposed an obligation upon
employers to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
observance.34
B. ReasonableAccommodation Without "Undue Hardship"
An employer's obligation to accommodate a religious employee did
not, however, dismiss cost considerations. The first EEOC guidelines35
initially provided that an employer's obligation to accommodate was not
required if doing so caused "serious inconvenience" to the conduct of

of 55-0, the court in Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark. 1972), held
that the EEOC regulations exceeded any "legitimate interpretation" of congressional intent:
"Neither the courts nor administrative agencies are free to substitute their own standards - even
though they deem them superior - for the standard imposed by the legislative act." Id.
32. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972). Senator Randolph successfully moved to incorporate the
court opinions ofDewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 342 (6th Cir. 1970), aft'd,402 U.S. 689
(1971), and Riley v. Bendix Corp., 330 F. Supp. 583 (M.D. Fla. 1971), rev'd, 464 F.2d 1113, into
the record. See 118 CONG. REc. 706-30 (1972). For a further discussion of Dewey and Riley, see
Brierton, supra note 12, at 171-72.
33. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972). Specifically, Senator Randolph noted that:
[P]ersons on both sides of the situation, the employer and the employee, are of an
understanding frame of mind and heart. I do not think they try to present
problems. I do not think they try to have abrasiveness come into these decisions.
I think they are just building upon conviction, and, hopefully, understanding and
a desire to achieve an adjustment.
Id.Senator Randolph added that the amendment provided "flexibility, there would be this approach
of understanding, even perhaps of discretion." Id.
34. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-26 1, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103, 103
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2004)); see also 118 CONG. REC. 731
(1972).
35. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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business.3 6 In 1967, the EEOC guidelines replaced "serious
inconvenience" with the term "undue hardship"37 without explanation.38
The 1972 amendment to title VII mirrored the language of the revised
EEOC guidelines and provided that reasonable accommodation was
required so long as the employer did not incur any undue hardship on its
ability to conduct business.39
Although undue hardship was not defined in the amendment, the
legislative record suggests that Congress anticipated that the amendment's
flexible approach would ultimately resolve any "gray areas" that might
arise in a given factual situation.4" For example, whereas an employer,
whose job specifically mandated weekend employment, would encounter
an undue hardship if he or she were required to accommodate an
employee's need to not work on Saturdays or Sundays, that employer
would not incur an undue hardship by rescheduling a religious employee's
work schedule to a customary five or six-day workweek. 4' Senator
Randolph envisioned that only "a very, very small percentage of cases"
would result in an inability to accommodate the religious employee.42
Thus, it is apparent from both the plain language of the amendment and

36. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(2) (1967)
(codifying the 1966 Guidelines).
37. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1968)
(codifying the 1967 Guidelines). Combining the definitions of "undue" and "hardship," an "undue
hardship" constitutes an excessive or unwarranted suffering or adversity. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 722, 1529 (7th ed. 1999). But see infra text accompanying note 73.
38. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1967).
39. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103,
103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2004)).
40. See 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972). During debate on the senate floor, Senator Randolph
responded to two hypothetical scenarios in an effort to clarify what constituted an undue hardship
in general terms:
I do not believe that there are really problems that would flow. from the adoption
of this amendment in connection with the employer meeting situations that he
could not properly handle with employees.., there are gray areas, and I recognize
them. But I think the thrust of what we would do here is important at this time.
Id.
41. These hypothetical scenarios were posed to Senator Randolph by Senator Harrison A.
Williams. Id. Based upon Senator Randolph's clarifications, Senator Williams concluded that the
amendment "promotes the constitutional demand" stipulated in the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment. Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 141, 146.
42. 118 CONG. REc. 706 (1972).
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legislative intent that Congress prescribed a "meaningful level of
accommodation. '
III. TITLE VII, RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATION, AND THE
U.S. SUPREME COURT

Courts interpreting title VII after enactment of the 1972 amendment
had difficulty ascertaining the scope of an employer's duties to a religious
employee.' For example, the Sixth Circuit noted that undue hardship
constituted "something greater than" hardship or inconvenience.4" The
Tenth Circuit, however, stated that the terms "reasonable accommodation"
and "undue hardship" were "relative" and "cannot be given any hard and
' When the U.S. Supreme Court decided Trans World
fast meaning."46
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,47 its first case interpreting section 701(j) of title
VII, it acknowledged that prior case law provided "little guidance as to the
scope of the employer's obligation. '
The U.S. Supreme Court has only decided two cases involving
religious accommodation and undue hardship under title VII: Hardison
49 Since the WRFA was first
and Ansonia BoardofEducation v. Philbrook.

43. Kaminer, supranote 28, at 585.
44. See, e.g., Sara L. Silbiger, Note, Heaven Can Wait: JudicialInterpretationof Title VIl's
Religious Accommodation Requirement Since Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 53 FORDHAM L.
REv. 839, 841-42 (1985) (finding that, although the legislative history addressed specific situations
that satisfied the undue hardship exception, no attempt was made to draft guidelines to ensure a
consistent interpretation); Peter Zablotsky, After the Fall: The Employer's Duty to Accommodate
Employee ReligiousPracticesUnder Title VllAfter Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 50 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 513, 515-17 (1989) (emphasizing that the 1972 Amendment did not define the scope of
both reasonable accommodation and undue hardship and did not explain the relationship between
the two).
45. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550-51 (6th Cir. 1975), aj'd,429 U.S. 65
(1976) (per curiam). The Sixth Circuit also found that accommodations that were "bothersome to
administer or disruptive of the operating routine" did not constitute an undue hardship. Draper v.
U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
46. Williams v. S. Union Gas Co., 529 F.2d 483, 489 (10th Cir. 1976).
47. 432 U.S. 63 (1977)
48. Id. at 75 n.10.
49. 479 U.S. 60 (1986)
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introduced in the House of Representatives in 1994,50 its primary objective
has been to reverse the Court's interpretations of title VU and "reestablish" original congressional intent to section 701 (j).5 , A discussion of
both U.S. Supreme Court decisions is necessary to place the WRFA in
proper context.
A. Hardison: Undue Hardshipand de Minimis Cost
In Hardison,the U.S. Supreme Court specifically addressed the extent
to which title VII obligated an employer to accommodate a religious
employee without undue hardship. 2 In reaching its determination, the
Court noted that eliminating employment discrimination was the
"paramount concern" of Congress when it enacted title VHII Hardison,
who converted to the Worldwide Church of God within a year after his
hiring,54 refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons and was
subsequently terminated.55 Prior to his discharge, Hardison informed his
manager of his religious convictions, and both parties implemented a
temporary resolution.56
Hardison's religious conflict resurfaced in connection with his union's
collective bargaining agreement and the seniority system contained
therein.57 When Trans World Airlines (TWA) asked Hardison to
50. Honorable Jerrold Nadler ofNew York introduced WRFA as House Resolution 5233. See
H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. (1994); see also 140 CONG. REc. E2157 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Nadler). House Resolution 5233 was intended to strengthen title VII so that
"employers make a real and commonsense effort to accommodate the religious practices of working
people... of all faiths to earn a living." 140 CoNG. REc. E2157 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement
of Rep. Nadler).
51. 118 CONG. REc. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum).
52. Hardison,432 U.S. at 63, 66, 84.
53. Id. at 85.
54. The Worldwide Church of God practices a religion that proscribes any work from sunset
on Fridays until sunset on Saturdays as well as on specific religious holidays. Id. at 67.
55. Id. at 69.
56. Id. at 67-68. Trans World Airlines (TWA), which operated a larger maintenance and
overhaul base, hired Hardison to serve as a clerk in its stores department. Id. at 66. The department
to which Hardison was assigned "must operate 24 hours per day, 365 days per year, and whenever
an employee's job in that department is not filled, an employee must be shifted from another
department, or a supervisor must cover the job." Id. at 66-67. The temporary accommodation
enabled Hardison to work the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift so that he could observe his Sabbath. Id. at 68.
57. Hardison,432 U.S. at 67-68. TWA initially hired Hardison for a position within Building
one, where Hardison had "sufficient seniority" to regularly observe the Sabbath. Id. In order to
accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs, TWA transferred him to Building Two. Id. Because the
two buildings had separate seniority lists, Hardison's seniority from Building one did not transfer
to Building Two. Id. As a result, Hardison was second from the bottom in terms of seniority. Id.
Although TWA permitted Hardison's union to change work assignments to accommodate him, the
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temporarily work Saturdays,58 he refused and proposed an alternative plan
to work four days per week.59 The employer rejected Hardison's proposal
and discharged him on grounds of insubordination for failure to work on
Saturday.6" The district court denied Hardison's claim that his employer
and union discriminated against him on the basis of religion in violation
of title VII, 6 ' but the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed.62
union refused to violate the seniority provisions contained in its collective bargaining agreement.
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 67-68. Hardison did not claim that the seniority system was designed to
discriminate against him. Id. at 82. Moreover, it was merely "coincidental that.., the seniority
system acted to compound [Hardison's] problems in exercising his religion." Id. (quoting Hardison
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877, 883 (W.D. Mo. 1974)).
58. Due to the seniority structure, Hardison lacked seniority to bid for alternative shifts. Id.
at 68; see supra text accompanying note 57.
59. Hardison,432 U.S. at 68.
60. Id. at 68-69. TWA cited that Hardison's position "was essential, and on weekends he was
the only available person on his shift to perform it. To leave the position empty would have
impaired supply shop function, which were crucial to airline operations." Id. at 68. The alternative,
which would have forced TWA to fill Hardison's position with a supervisor, would have
"undermanned another operation." Id. at 69.
61. Addressing Hardison's claim against his union, the district court concluded that title VII
imposed no obligation upon unions to ignore contractual obligations contained within collective
bargaining agreements. Hardison,375 F. Supp. at 882. The district court noted that the union could
have instituted changes in work shifts if it chose to do so, however, title VII imposed no such
obligation: "[T]o require the union to ignore seniority in every case in which an employee with
lesser seniority can observe his Sabbath only by changing shifts with a more senior employee
would work an undue hardship on the union." Id.
In response to Hardison's claim against TWA, the district court stated that the duty imposed
upon an employer by title VII did not permit the imposition of hardships upon other employees in
order to accommodate a religious coworker. Id. at 889. The employer was only required to "take
affirmative action to try to find a way to permit the employee to observe his religious as he wishes."
Id. The Hardison court concluded that TWA did, in fact, take affirmative action in order to
accommodate Hardison by conducting meetings with him, authorizing the union to find other
employees with whom he could swap shifts, and enabling him to observe religious holidays. Id. at
890-91. Further accommodation would have created an undue hardship on the employer's conduct
of its business. Hardison, 375 F. Supp. at 891.
62. Hardison v. Trans World Airline, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 44 (8th Cir. 1975). The appellate
court emphasized that an employer must make a concerted effort to accommodate an employee's
religious observances and "may not accept the role of a Pontius Pilate." Id. at 39. The appellate
court rejected the trial court's conclusions that TWA attempted to reasonably accommodate
Hardison and that any alternatives to the accommodations offered would have imposed an undue
hardship. Id. It proceeded to analyze potential, alternative accommodations thatthe employer could
have offered to Hardison and concluded that, in each circumstance, the employer failed to prove
an undue hardship. Id. at 39-42. Holding that TWA engaged in religious discrimination by failing
to reasonably accommodate Hardison, the appellate court remanded for a determination of
appropriate relief. Id. at 44. With respect to an employer's duty to accommodate, the appellate court
explained: "In determining whether a possible accommodation would result in undue hardship or
mere inconvenience, we must look to the facts of each case. The burden of demonstrating undue
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The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that title
VII did not require an employer to tailor exceptions to its seniority system
in order to accommodate a religious employee.63 The Court emphasized
that title VII's primary objective was to eliminate employment
discrimination and to ensure that similarly situated employees did not
receive disparate treatment.' By denying one employee's shift preference
in order to accommodate a religious employee, an employer would, the
Court concluded, resort to unequal treatment proscribed by title VII. 65
Although it rejected the notion of differential treatment, the Court
explained that title VII permits disparate terms of compensation or
privileges for employees under seniority systems 66 provided that the
reasons for those differences are not based upon intent to discriminate.67
Nonetheless, absent legislative intent suggesting otherwise, the Court
found that accommodating a religious employee should not supplant a

hardship is upon the employer." Hardison, 527 F.2d at 40. Additionally, the appellate court
accepted the district court's conclusion that a union may have an obligation to accommodate and
may incur liability if its actions prevent the employer from reasonably accommodating the
employee. Id.at 42. Affirming the district court's ruling in favor of the union, the appellate court
did not reach "the effect of a union's refusal to modify its employee seniority rights when no other
accommodation can be accomplished without undue hardship to the employer's business." Id.at
43.
63. Hardison,432 U.S. at 82-83.
64. Id. at 71. The Court noted that discrimination was not tolerated in any circumstances,
regardless of whether the individual belonged to a majority or minority. Id. at 71-72.
65. Id. at 81. The Court's hesitance to require unequal or differential treatment resulted from
"courts' general reluctance to require much more than neutrality in interpreting Title VII."
Kaminer, supra note 28, at 588. As a result, "Title VII's religious accommodation provision poses
a challenge to the ... neutral ideology embedded in the interpretation of the remainder of the
statute." Karen Engle, The PersistenceofNeutrality: The Failureof the Religious Accommodation
Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 320 (1997). In dissent, Justice Marshall
admonished the Court for establishing the means by which an accommodation could be rejected
"simply because it involves preferential treatment" and added that to do so would deflate its
efficacy. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. Hardison,432 U.S. at 81. The Court characterized seniority provisions and, specifically,
the collective bargaining agreements in which they were contained, as part of "the core of our
national labor policy." Id.at 79.
67. Id. at 81-82. The Court based its conclusion upon the fact that title VII specifically
addressed the lawfulness of seniority or merit based systems in section 703(h): "absent a
discriminatory purpose, the operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful employment
practice even if the system has some discriminatory consequences." Id.at 82.
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previously implemented and agreed-upon seniority system.68 Thus,
seniority trumped religious accommodation.69
The Court also addressed the viability of several accommodation
methods cited by the Eighth Circuit in order to determine whether each
constituted an undue hardship upon the employer.70 The Court found that
each proposed accommodation would result in unequal treatment of
employees based upon religion7 and would involve costs to the
employer.72 The Court concluded that any accommodation requiring the
employer to incur "more than a de minimis cost... is an undue hardship"
under title VII.7 3
The Court's definition of an undue hardship constituting greater than
a de minimis cost provided
only the narrowest of obligations upon employers. Moreover, the
Court's concern with reverse discrimination suggests a spirit of
statutory application that would protect, and might even justify,
only minimal efforts by the employer to accommodate his

68. Id. at 79. The Court acknowledged that seniority systems could be modified by statute
in order to further a "strong public policy interest." Id. at 79 n. 12 (quoting Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976)).
69. See Silbiger, supra note 44, at 847.
70. Hardison,432 U.S. at 84. Specifically, the Court addressed Hardison's proposed four-day
workweek and replacing Hardison's shift on Saturdays with available employees through the
payment of premium wages. Id. In both instances, the court of appeals found that neither
constituted an undue hardship upon TWA. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33,3942 (8th Cir. 1975).
71. See supra text accompanying note 65.
72. Hardison,432 U.S. at 84. The costs cited included loss of efficiency in the other jobs
from which a replacement for Hardison was secured and higher wages paid to employees as an
inducement to work on Saturdays. Id. Justice Marshall asserted that the majority's view of the
available options of accommodation was "myopic" and was unsupported by the findings at trial.
Id. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 84. Justice Marshall questioned whether "simple English usage" permitted an
interpretation of undue hardship to constitute greater than de minimis cost. Id. at 92 n.6 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice Marshall instead emphasized that the Court should "confront the
constitutionality of requiring employers to bear more than de minimis costs" in light of the fact that
the EEOC guidelines provide an example of undue hardship only where no qualified substitute for
the religious employee existed. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see alsoGuidelines on Discrimination
Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1976) (codifying the 1975 Guidelines) (stating that
one example of an undue hardship included "where the employee's needed work cannot be
performed by another employee of substantially similar qualifications during the period of
absence").

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

employee's religious observance in situations in which other kinds
of religious accommodation are required.74
In dissent, Justice Marshall concluded that the Court's ruling facilitated a
"most tragic" consequence by forcing Americans to choose between their
faiths or their livelihoods.75 In doing so, the Court "seriously
eroded ... one of this Nation's pillars of strength - our hospitality to
religious diversity. "76
B. The Immediate Aftermath of Hardison
Within two months of the Hardisondecision, Congress initiated what
has become a long and continuing effort to reverse the Court's definition
of undue hardship. In August 1977, New York Congressman Stephen J.
Solarz introduced legislation to amend section 7010) of title VII by
replacing undue hardship with "severe material hardship., 77 The following
spring, Representative Solarz introduced a separate bill designed to modify
federal overtime provisions permitting employees to work extra hours and
make up for absences resulting from religious observances. 78 The
74. Silbiger, supranote 44, at 847 (footnotes omitted).
75. Hardison,432 U.S. at 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated: "[A] society
that truly values religious pluralism cannot compel adherents of minority religions to make the
cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their job." Id. at 87 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice
Marshall added that the Court's decision dealt "a fatal blow to all efforts under Title VII to
accommodate work requirements to religious practices." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 97 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall concluded that the Court "adopt[ed]
the very position that Congress expressly rejected in 1972" and admonished the Court for enabling
an employer to refuse "even the most minor special privilege" to a religious employee. Id. at 87
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
77. See 123 CONG. REC. 25965 (1977); H.R. 8670, 95th Cong. (1st Sess. 1977). The bill
proposed the following amendment: "(j) The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious
observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that there is no possible
accommodation to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice
without severe material hardship on the conduct of the employer." H.R. 8670, 95th Cong. (1st Sess.
1977). The bill had no cosponsors and met its demise in the Committee on Education and Labor.
78. See Hearingon ReligiousAccommodation Before the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n on Religious Accommodation 597 (1978) (testimony of Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz) [hereinafter EEOC Comm'n Report]; H.R. 11769, 95th Cong. (2d Sess. 1978). House
Resolution 11769 stated, in pertinent part:
[T]he Civil Service Commission shall prescribe regulations providing for work
schedules under which an employee whose religious faith requires the abstention
from work during certain periods of time, may elect to engage in overtime work
for time lost for meeting the obligation of his or her faith. Any employee who so

A STRUGGLE OF BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS

timeliness of such actions seemed to confirm the prescience of Justice
Marshall's concerns.79
1. The EEOC Hearings on Religious Accommodation of 1978
During the spring of 1978, the EEOC initiated a series of hearings
across the country designed to address the ramifications of the Supreme
Court's ruling." Characterizing Hardison as a "troubling decision," the
EEOC reported that, based upon claims it received, many employers
believed that Hardison revoked the requirement of accommodation
entirely.8 In fact, one witness noted that Hardisonfacilitated a "chilling
effect" whereby claimants felt the veracity of their charges were
significantly weakened.82 Overall, employers sought clarification by either
seeking limitations upon their requirement to accommodate 83 or suggesting
that the EEOC avoid promulgating regulations that would increase
confusion. 4
elects such overtime work shall be granted compensatory time off from his
scheduled tour of duty (in lieu of overtime pay) for such religious reasons.
H.R. 11769,95th Cong. (2d Sess. 1978). The bill included twelve cosponsors, see 124 CoNG. REC.
8001 (1978). However, the bill did not pass through the Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 75 & 76.
80. The EEOC held hearings on religious accommodation in New York, Los Angeles, and
Milwaukee between April and May in 1978. The proceedings began in New York with the purpose
of providing "data to enable the Commission to clear up any existing certainty" in the area of
religious accommodation. EEOC Comm 'n Report, supra note 78, at 3 (statement of Chairwoman
Eleanor Holmes Norton). The Chairwoman added that the Commission's purpose was to ensure that
an individual's First Amendment right to freely practice religion remained a "vital ...right" for
all Americans. Id.
81. Id. at 2 (statement of Chairwoman Eleanor Holmes Norton).
82. Id. at 41 (testimony of Gordon Engen).
83. See, e.g., id.at 526 (written statement of Federated Employers of the Bay Area)
(requesting that EEOC guidelines place an affirmative obligation upon a prospective employee to
disclose any religious obligation that might preclude the applicant from working on certain days);
id. at 577-81 (written statement of Reynolds Aluminum) (stating that Hardisonis the "only possible
basis on which an obligation to accommodate can exist" and questioning the benefit of EEOC
guidelines); id. at 592-93 (statement of San Diego Gas & Electric Company) (stating the
unreasonableness to provide special treatment to religious employees on holidays given the nature
of the public utility industry and recommending the EEOC exempt public utilities from its
regulations).
84. See, e.g., id.at 608 (statement of Union Oil of California) ("Attempting to correct
[problems] through the process of issuing more complex guidelines falls heavily on the majority
of employers that comply with the law, while doing little to correct the abuses of the few employers
who choose to violate the existing guidelines."); id. at 615-16 (written statement of Western
Airlines) ("A broader accommodation principle than expressed in TWA v. Hardisonwould establish
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Additional testimony sought to place Hardison within proper
perspective. The Director of the EEOC's New York office stated that:
Hardisonmay well have created a degree of confusion in the minds
of some, but it is clear ... that Hardison was somewhat specific
... the requirement that employers maintain a duty to accommodate
to their employee's religious beliefs remains substantially in
effect . . . we look upon the Title VII provision . . . as being
substantially unchanged.85
Other witnesses maintained that Hardison created no confusion. An
attitude of goodwill and cooperation among employers and employees,
these witnesses explained, was "all that is necessary to make a reasonable
accommodation."86
2. Scaling Back Hardison:The 1980 Revised EEOC Guidelines
Based upon the findings obtained during the 1978 hearings and in an
attempt to limit the scope of Hardison,87 the EEOC issued new guidelines
for religious discrimination in 1980.88 The 1980 guidelines stipulated that
title VII imposed an obligation on both an employer and labor organization
to reasonably accommodate a religious employee absent a showing of

requirements that would be ... impossible, for an airline to comply with."); id. at 323 (testimony
of Harry M. Brown, Esq.) ("[Clarifications] can be promulgated without the necessity of lengthy
rule making proceedings in the form of a guideline or an enforcement policy.").
85. EEOC Comm 'n Report, supra note 78, at 25 (testimony of Arthur W. Stem).
86. Id. at 212 (testimony of Ron Wiesel). Similar sentiment was expressed by the Union Oil
Company of California in its written statement. Id. at 607-09. This sentiment is still expressed
today. See Mark DeMeester, Accommodating Religion in the Workplace, 46 ADVOCATE 8,9 (2003)
(recommending that employers not unilaterally determine an employee's religious needs, not apply
employment policies mechanically, maintain respect for religious employees, and train managers
so that "educated analysis and considered, measured action.., can reduce the likelihood that [an
employer] will be accused of violating an employee's religious rights").
87. In Appendix A to the revised 1980 EEOC guidelines, the Commission noted that
"[e]mployers appeared to have substantial anticipatory concerns but no, or very little, actual
experience with the problems they theorized would emerge by providing reasonable
accommodation for religious practices." Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29
C.F.R. § 1605 app. A (1981) (codifying the 1980 Guidelines). The Commission also enumerated
several employee religious practices that employers were not accommodating, including observance
of Sabbath or religious holidays, prayer breaks during working hours, certain dietary requirements,
not working during a mourning period for a deceased relative, and certain dress and personal
grooming habits. Id.
88. Id. § 1605.
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undue hardship.89 The EEOC created aperse rule that an undue hardship
could not be invoked based upon a "mere assumption" that several other
employees would require similar religious accommodations to the primary
employee seeking the accommodation in question.9" When more than one
method of reasonable accommodation did not impose an undue hardship
upon the employer, the EEOC stipulated that the employer or labor
organization had an affirmative duty to offer the "alternative which least
disadvantages the individual."'" The 1980 guidelines additionally provided
a non-exhaustive list of viable alternatives for accommodating religious
practices. 92
Addressing the de minimis standard for undue hardship, the EEOC
stipulated that it would consider various indicia to determine whether costs
incurred by an employer to accommodate constituted an undue hardship. 93
Limiting the reach of Hardison, the EEOC declared that any
administrative costs an employer incurred in order to provide a reasonable
accommodation would constitute de minimis costs. 4 As a result, the EEOC
found that a significant number of possible accommodations could be
implemented despite the narrowly construed U.S. Supreme Court
standard. 95
C. Philbrook: The Sufficiency of One Accommodation
Six years after the EEOC issued its revised guidelines, the U.S.
Supreme Court decided its second and most recent title VH religious
accommodation case. In Philbrook,96 the Court specifically addressed
whether an employer's efforts to adjust a religious employee's work
schedule satisfied the employer's requirement to reasonably accommodate

89. Id. § 1605.2(b)(1)-(2).
90. Id.§ 1605.2(c)(1).
91. Id.§ 1605.2(c)(2)(ii). But see infra text accompanying notes 113-17.
92. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1). Included in these provisions were "Voluntary Substitutes
and Swaps," "Flexible Scheduling," and "Lateral Transfer and Change of Job Assignments." Id.
§ 1605.2(d)(1)(i)-(iii). By enumerating these examples, the Commission "attempted to preserve the
right to a reasonable accommodation . . .in accordance with the original intent of the 1972
amendment." Brierton, supranote 12, at 175.
93. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1) (1980). For example, the Commission would take into
consideration the number of individuals requiring a particular accommodation, the size of the
employer, and the employer's identified operating costs. Id.
94. Id.Defining administrative costs as de minimis costs prevented an employer from
justifying its refusal to provide an employee with a reasonable accommodation based solely upon
costs "involved in rearranging schedules and recording substitutions for payroll purposes." Id.
95. See Kaminer, supra note 28, at 590.
96. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
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an employee's religious practices under title VII. 97 The case was strikingly

similar to Hardison: an employee's membership in and religious
observances of the Worldwide Church of God created a conflict between
the employee's faith and terms of a collective bargaining agreement.98
During each academic year, Philbrook, a high school instructor, was
absent for six schooldays due to religious observances.99 A collective

bargaining agreement between the teachers' association and the school
board provided each teacher with three days of annual leave for religious
holiday observance.l 0 In addition, each teacher could incur absences of up
to three days for "necessary personal business," provided that these
absences were utilized for a purpose not otherwise specified in the
employment contract.' 0 ' Therefore, a teacher could not utilize an absence
permitted for "necessary personal business" to extend observance of a
religious holiday.'0 2
Philbrook requested that the school board adopt one of two proposed
alternatives to its absences policies so that he could observe religious
holidays without salary deductions. 3 The school board rejected both
proposals." ° Philbrook alleged that the restrictive use of his "necessary
personal business" absences violated title VII.O5 The district court denied

97. Id. at 63.
98. Id. at 62.
99. Id. at 63. The Court noted that Philbrook's faith proscribed secular employment during
specific holidays. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 54.
100. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 63-64. Each teacher received a total of eighteen days of leave for
illness per year, with cumulative provisions. Id. at 63. Any accumulated leave time could be used
for purposes aside from time off due to illness. Id. Thus, as the Court explained, a teacher could
potentially designate absences up to five days for a death in family or other circumstances as
provided by each employment contract. Id. Absences for religious holidays, unlike other
categorized absences, were not charged against the teacher's annual or accumulated leave. Id. at
64.
101.. Id.
102. Id. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, the instant case focused upon those limitations
placed upon the use of personal business leave. Id.
103. Id. Prior to the 1976-1977 academic year, Philbrook utilized his three day absences to
observe religious holidays and incurred unauthorized leave payment deductions on other holidays.
Id. In 1976, Philbrook sought to avoid incurring payment deductions by either scheduling required
hospital visits or reporting to school on church holy days. Id. The school board permitted Philbrook
to incur deductions in pay to observe religious holidays. Id. at 64.
104. Id. at 65. The first proposal enabled Philbrook to apply personal business leave absences
incurred as a result of his religious observances. Id. at 64. The second proposal enabled Philbrook
to pay the costs of a substitute teacher himself and receive full pay for the additional absences
incurred as a result of religious holidays. Id. at 65.
105. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 65.
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Philbrook relief, °6 but the appellate court found that Philbrook established
a case of religious discrimination and reversed.10 7 Responding specifically
to Hardison'scaution against preferential treatment, the appellate court
noted a difference between differential and privileged treatment."18
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision insofar
as it remanded the case for further factual inquiry to determine whether
unpaid leave constituted a reasonable accommodation given the facts of
the case.'0 9 The Court noted that Hardison did not address whether an
employer must choose among potential accommodations for the religious
employee because the Hardison Court determined that any
accommodation in that case resulted in an undue hardship."0 The
Philbrook Court, however, rejected the principle of choice articulated by
the appellate court"' as unfounded in either title VII or its legislative

106. The district court noted that Philbrook's free exercise of religion was "not subject to
arbitrary power." Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of Educ., No. N77-489, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16556,
at * 17 (D. Conn. May 22, 1984). Philbrook, the district court emphasized, was not forced to forego
his religious faith but rather could "go without let or hindrance whenever and wherever he wished."
Id. at *17. The court added: "The plaintiff did not want it that free. He wanted it to be free as far
as his desire or obligation permitted plus pay. This is why he said he did not exercise his 'unfettered
right to worship, it would cost him money- not that he was prevented. "'Id. Since Philbrook could
neither prove a violation of his religion nor loss of employment, the court concluded that his title
VII claim failed. Id. at *21.
107. Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. Of Educ., 757 F.2d 476-77, 488 (2d Cir. 1985). The appellate
court first addressed whether Philbrook established a prima facie of religious discrimination under
title VII by demonstrating that the employee: (1) had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted
with an employment requirement; (2) informed the employer of this belief; and (3) was disciplined
for failure to comply with the conflicting employment requirement. Id. at 481.
Concluding that Philbrook met his burden of establishing a prima facie case, the circuit court
analyzed whether the school board accommodated Philbrook by extending him three days of paid
leave and unpaid leave for religious holidays. Id. at 482-85. The court reasoned that, based upon
the approach taken by section 1605.2 of the EEOC guidelines, an employer that proposed an
accommodation did not satisfy its statutory duty to accommodate "unless the employee's suggested
accommodations would lead to greater than de minimis cost." Id. at 485. An element of choice,
therefore dictated: unless Philbrook's two proposed accommodations constituted undue hardship
to the school board, the employer would be required to accept either one in lieu of its own
accommodation. See supra text accompanying note 104; Philbrook,757 F.2d at 485.
108. Philbrook,757 F.2d at 487. The court emphasized that Philbrook "has asked to be treated
differently; he has not asked for privileged treatment. In exchange for additional days off, he is
willing to make up for time off and pay for the substitute." Id.
109. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 66.
110. Id. at67.
111. See supra text accompanying note 107.
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history. " 2 While the Court acknowledged that the EEOC guidelines
stipulated that "[w]hen there is more than one means of accommodation
which would not cause undue hardship, the employer.., must offer the
alternative which least disadvantages the individual with respect to his or
' 3 it emphasized that the guidelines did not
her employment opportunities,"
1 14
law.
of
have the force
The majority opinion also expressed a deep-rooted distrust of an
employee's motivations for seeking religious accommodation." 5 The
Court suggested that permitting an employee to participate in any
accommodation selection process would enable the employee to use
religion as a means to extract the greatest incentives at the expense of the
employer." 6 As a shield against employees' exploitation of their
employers, the Court concluded that any reasonable accommodation
offered to a religious employee fulfilled the employer's statutory
obligation. 17 In the event that an employer could not reasonably
accommodate an employee, 1the
employer must then prove it could not do
8
hardship.
undue
so without
Justice Marshall questioned the majority's reasoning and emphasized
that the legislative history of the 1972 Randolph amendment to title VII
suggested a flexible approach to accommodation." 9 Citing that the only
accommodation offered by the school board did not "eliminate the

112. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68. The majority reiterated that, by the statute's terms, an
employee must demonstrate its inability to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious
observances or practice without undue hardship. Id.
113. Id. at 69 n.6 (quoting Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F.R. §
1605.2(c)(ii) (1986)).
114. Id. The Court added: "To the extent that the guideline, like the approach of the Court of
Appeals, requires the employer to accept any alternative favored by the employee short of undue
hardship, we find the guideline simply inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute." Id. But
cf id. at 73-74 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (according legal weight to the statute and emphasizing that
the Court relied upon the EEOC guidelines to provide the basis for title VII claim in sexual
harassment cases).
115. Seeid. at69.
116. See id. The Court cautioned that, under the appellate court's accommodation by choice
standard, "the employee is given every incentive to hold out for the most beneficial
accommodation, despite the fact that an employer offers a reasonable resolution of the conflict."
Id.
117. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 68. Once the employer offered a reasonable accommodation, the
majority stressed, it had no obligation to prove that an employee's alternative accommodation
would cause it undue hardship. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 73 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra text
accompanying note 33.
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12 Justice Marshall argued that the employer should be required
conflict,""
to implement an alternative, reasonable accommodation. 21 Exhausting "all
reasonable accommodations" and proving any remaining alternatives
resulted in undue hardship, Justice Marshall concluded, should be the
appropriate interpretation of title VII and the EEOC guidelines. 122

D. The Legacy ofPhilbrook
Philbrookenabled employers to offer a low level of accommodation. 123
The treatment the Supreme Court accorded to religious accommodation,
however, appeared inconsistent with cases involving discrimination based
on race or national origin. 124 Despite the fact that the Court granted the
employer broad discretion to determine the reasonable accommodation it
offered to the employee, lower courts have set an important limitation: the
claimed undue
hardship must be actual rather than speculative or
125

theoretical.

An employer's selection of a reasonable accommodation should
simultaneously remove the conflict while not treating the religious practice
less favorably than similarly accommodated secular practices. 126Examples
of such an accommodation might include voluntary shift swaps, job
127
transfers, unpaid leave, or exceptions for personal grooming.
Accommodations that imposed nontrivial costs, such as decreases in

120. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
supra text accompanying note 103.
121. Philbrook,479 U.S. at 74 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Marshall explained that one accommodation may not always be "the reasonable accommodation
which best resolves the conflict between the needs of the employer and employee ... [i]f an
employee, in turn, offers another reasonable proposal that results in a more effective resolution
without causing undue hardship, the employer should be required to implement it." Id. (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 75 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
123. See Theresa M. Beiner & John M.A. DiPippa, Hostile Environments and the Religious
Employee, 19 U. ARK. LTrLE RoCK L.J. 577, 601 (1997).
124. See The Workplace Religious Freedom Act: Hearing on S.1124 Before the Sen. Comm.
on Labor andHumanResources, 105th Cong. 39 (1997) (prepared statement of Richard T. Foltin)
[hereinafter Foltin Testimony] (stating that the U.S. Supreme Court has permitted a plaintiff in
those cases to "demonstrate discrimination by proving the existence of alternative employment
practices which have a less adverse impact on minorities"); see supratext accompanying note 114.
125. See, e.g., Cook v. Chrysler Corp., 981 F.2d 336, 339 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that an
employer's costs of accommodation constitute present, not anticipated undue hardship).
126. See Foltin Testimony, supra note 124, at 39.
127. James A. Sonne, The Perils of Universal Accommodation: The Workplace Religious
Freedom Act of 2003 and the Affirmative Action of 147,096,000 Souls, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1023, 1043 (2004).
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employee productivity,'28 health and safety concerns, 129 and replacement
costs,' have been deemed undue hardships."'3 Nonetheless, the standard
enunciated by the PhilbrookCourt remains intact.
IV. THE PROPOSED WORKPLACE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 2003
The WRFA, whose substantive birth can be partially traced to the
summer of 1977,132 seeks to "restore the requirement that employers make
a real and commonsense effort to accommodate the religious practices of
working people."'3 While the current act represents a bipartisan effort in
the Senate,' 34 both Houses of Congress have, over the course of several
congressional sessions, introduced legislation seeking to amend title VII
as it pertains to accommodation for the religious concerns of employees.
Members of Congress began introducing the WRFA in 1994.' Since
1996,136 each Congress has introduced the WRFA in various
128. See, e.g., Bruffv. N. Miss. Health Servs., Inc., 244 F.3d 495,501 (5th Cir. 2001); Wilson
v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding that a "substantial
disruption at work... [was] antithetical to the concept of reasonable accommodation); Mann v.
Frank, 7 F.3d 1365, 1370(8th Cir. 1993) (stating that an accommodation that resulted in a decrease
of efficiency constituted undue hardship).
129. See, e.g., Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745, 758 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(finding that "where any proposed religious accommodation threatens to compromise safety... the
employer's burden of establishing an undue burden is light indeed").
130. See, e.g., Cooper v. Oak Rubber Co., 15 F.3d 1375, 1380 (6th Cir. 1994) (stating that
hiring additional workers for an entire week in order to permit an employee to take off Saturdays
constituted undue hardship).
131. See Sonne, supranote 127, at 1044.
132. See supra Part III.B.
133. 140 CONG. REc. E2157 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Rep. Nadler). The 1972
amendment to title VII "was a fitting compliment to the Supreme Court's own pro-accommodation
view... [h]owever, the Court has since changed its approach, and religious accommodations are
now the constitutional exception, not the rule." James M. Oleske, Jr., Federalism,Free Exercise,
and Title VII: ReconsideringReasonableAccommodation, 6 U. PA. J.CONST. L. 525, 572 (2004).
One commentator noted that the WRFA is "a vehicle by which Congress can demonstrate that its
frequent tributes to religion are not mere rhetoric but evidence of the abiding values that America's
laws must promote and protect." Nathan J.Diament, Free to Have a Career-Anda Conscience,
WASH. POST., Apr. 24, 2000, at A25.
134. S. 893, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
135. See 140 CONG. REC. E2157 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Rep. Nadler); see also
H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994).
136. See 124 CONG. REc. S10428 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry); see also
S.2071, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996). Senator Kerry stated that "[t]he refusal of an employer,
absent undue hardship, to provide reasonable accommodation of a religious practice, should be seen
as a form of religious discrimination, as originally intended by Congress in 1972." 142 CONG. REC.
S 10428 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kerry). Like its predecessor in the House of
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manifestations.'37 No previous version of the bill passed out of committee
or subcommittee, suggesting that "the fact that no such measures have yet
. . . some congressional support for the Court's
passed reflects
38
approach."'

The WRFA of 2003 replaces the current definition of undue
hardship,'39 requires the costs of accommodation to be quantified by a nonRepresentatives, the 1996 proposed version of the WRFA ensured equal employment opportunities
for employees regardless of their religious beliefs and practices while protecting employers from
an undue burden. Compare H.R. 5233, 103d Cong. (2d Sess. 1994) with S. 2071, 104th Cong. (2d
Sess. 1996).
137. The WRFA was introduced as S. 92 during the 105th Congress in January 1997. 143
CONG. REC. S472 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry); see also S. 92, 105th Cong.
(1st Sess. 1997). Six months later, S. 92 was replaced by a revised version of the WRFA. See 143
CONG. REC. S8590 (daily ed. July 31, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kerry); see also S. 1124, 105th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1997). During the same Congress, a companion bill to S. 1124 in the House of
Representatives was introduced. See 144 CONG. REC. E4 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1998) (statement of
Rep. Goodling); see also H.R. 2948, 105th Cong. (1 st Sess. 1997). During the 106th Congress, Sen.
Kerry reintroduced the WRFA as S. 1668. See 145 CONG. REC. S 11647 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1999);
see also S. 1668, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999). In 2000, six years after Rep. Nadler introduced H.R.
5233, see supra text accompanying note 135, he reintroduced the WRFA as H.R. 4237. 146 CONG.
REc. H2122 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2000) (statement ofRep. Nadler); see also H.R. 4237, 106th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2000). Another version, S. 2572, was introduced by Sen. Kerry during the 107th
Congress. See 148 CONG. REC. S4865 (daily ed. May 23, 2002) (statement of Sen. Kerry); see also
S. 2572, 107th Cong. (2d Sess. 2002).
138. Sonne, supra note 127, at 1045.
139. The text of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act states:
To amend title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to establish provisions with
respect to religious accommodation in employment, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House ofRepresentatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Workplace Religious Freedom Act of 2003."
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS.
(a) Definitions. Section 7010) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.
2000e(j)) is amended (1) by inserting "(1)" after "(j)";
(2) by inserting ", after initiating and engaging in an affirmative and bona fide
effort," after "unable";
(3) by striking "an employee's" and all that follows through "religious" and
inserting "an employee's religious"; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
"(2)(A) In this subsection, the term "employee" includes an employee (as defined
in subsection (f)), or a prospective employee, who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, is qualified to perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.
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exhaustive list of factors, and provides that an accommodation must
actually remove the conflict.14 ° In addition, the WRFA requires that an
(B) In this paragraph, the term "perform the essential functions" includes carrying
out the core requirements of an employment position and does not include
carrying out practices relating to clothing, practices relating to taking time off, or
other practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on the ability to
perform job functions, if any of the practices described in this subparagraph
restrict the ability to wear religious clothing, to take time off for a holy day, or to
participate in a religious observance or practice.
(3) In this subsection, the term "undue hardship" means an accommodation
requiring significant difficulty or expense. For purposes of determining whether
an accommodation requires significant difficulty or expense, factors to be
considered in making the determination shall include (A) the identifiable cost of the accommodation, including the costs of loss of
productivity and of retraining or hiring employees or transferring employees from 1
facility to another;
(B) the overall financial resources and size of the employer involved, relative
to the number of its employees; and
(C) for an employer with multiple facilities, the geographic separateness or
administrative or fiscal relationship of the facilities.
(b) Employment practices. Section 703 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is
amended by adding at the end the following:
(o)(1) In this subsection:
(A) The term "employee" has the meaning given the term in section 7010)(2).
(B) The term "leave of general usage" means leave provided under the policy
or program of an employer, under which (i) an employee may take leave by adjusting or altering the work schedule or
assignment of the employee according to criteria determined by the employer;
and
(ii) the employee may determine the purpose for which the leave is to be
utilized.
(2) For purposes of determining whether an employer has committed an
unlawful employment practice under this title by failing to provide a
reasonable accommodation to the religious observance or practice of an
employee, for an accommodation to be considered to be reasonable, the
accommodation shall remove the conflict between employment requirements
and the religious observance or practice of the employee.
(3) An employer shall be considered to commit such a practice by failing to
provide such a reasonable accommodation for an employee if the employer
refuses to permit the employee to utilize leave of general usage to remove
such a conflict solely because the leave will be used to accommodate the
religious observance or practice of the employee.
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE; APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.
(a) Effective Date. Except as provided in subsection (b), this Act and the
amendments made by section 2 take effect on the date of enactment of this
Act.
(b) Application of amendments. The amendments made by section 2 do not
apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of enactment of this
Act.
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employee demonstrate an ability to "perform the essential functions" of
the employment position as a prerequisite to receiving any
language
accommodation.14 ' Several of the WRFA's definitions resemble
142
utilized in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
V. THE GREAT SCHISM

Criticism of the WRFA has been substantial. One commentator
suggested that the WRFA, given its similarities to the ADA, actually treats
religious observance like a disability. 143 Opponents of the WRFA have
focused primarily upon the effects that accommodating employees with
religious needs would have upon third parties.'" Third parties might
consist of fellow coworkers or individuals who interact with or receive
services from employees with religious needs.145 These concerns have
arisen within the context of defining the term "perform the essential
functions," '4 6 modifying the standard of an undue hardship as a
"significant difficulty or expense,' 4 7 and requiring that an employee's

S. 893, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
140. See S. 893 § 2(b)(2).
141. Id. at § 2(a); see infra text accompanying note 146.
142. Compare S. 893, with Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8)
(2000) [hereinafter ADA]; see also The Workplace Religious Freedom Act: Hearingon S.1124
Before the Senate Committee on Laborand HumanResources, 105th Cong. 56 (1997) [hereinafter
Corrada Testimony] (testimony of Roberto Corrada); 149 CONG. REC. S5353 (daily ed. Apr. 11,
2003) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (noting that the "definition of undue hardship is used in the
Americans with Disabilities Act and has worked well in that context"). For a thorough discussion
comparing the WRFA with the ADA, see Sonne, supranote 127, at 1046-59.
143. Roger Clegg, Prayingon the Job: There's No Need For a New Workplace Law to Treat
Religion Like a Disability, LEGAL TIMES, June 9, 2003, at 58. In fact, Clegg believes that the
WRFA should be renamed the "Religious Disabilities Act" and argues that accommodating
religious beliefs and practices in a manner similar to disabilities would encourage greater workplace
friction and resentment than would accommodating employees with handicaps. Id.
144. See Memorandum from the American Civil Liberties Union to Members of the U.S.
Senate on the Harmful Effect of the Workplace Religious Freedom Act (S. 893), on Critical
Personal and Civil Rights, to Members of the U.S. Senate (June 2, 2004) [hereinafter ACLU
Memo], available at http://www.aclu.org/ReligiousLiberty/Religious Liberty.cfm?ID=
15886&c=142 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
145. See id.; see also Foltin & Standish, supranote 2, at 24.
146. S. 893 § 2(a). Specifically, the issue involves the meaning of the term "perform the
essential functions" in relation to the "practices that may have a temporary or tangential impact on
the ability to perform job functions." Id; see also ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 4; WRFA
Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 9-10.
147. S. 893 § 2(a)(3).
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accommodation "remove the conflict."' 48 Specifically, opponents maintain
that the WRFA would: (1) enable courts to find title VH violations in cases
where the religious employee was denied relief under current law; (2)
diminish the rights of minorities; and (3) deny women access to
reproductive healthcare.' 49 Additionally, a general debate as to whether the
WRFA is consistent with the Establishment Clause has emerged. 50 Each
of these concerns is considered below.
A. Will the WRFA BreatheLife into Claims that Courts Deny Under the
CurrentStandard?
Naturally, employers have opposed the WRFA since it imposes upon
them a stricter standard for accommodating religious employees. 15' Other
critics, notably the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),'52 believe that
the WRFA would "sanction activities by employees that have not been

148. See supra text accompanying notes 26, 140.
149. See generallyACLU Memo, supra note 144. New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer
rejected these criticisms and characterized them as "simply wrong." Spitzer, supra note 10, at 7.
Spitzer cited a recently enacted New York law that provided greater protections for employees of
faith and suggested that the WRFA is simply its federal counterpart. Id. In particular, the New York
law
has not resulted in the infringement of the rights of others, or in the additional
litigation that [opponents of the WRFA] predict . . . will occur if WRFA is
enacted. Nor has it been burdensome on business. Rather, it strikes the correct
balance between accommodating individual liberty and the needs of business and
the delivery of services. So does WRFA.
Id.
150. See Gregory J. Gawlik, The PoliticsofReligion: "ReasonableAccommodation " and the
EstablishmentClause an Analysis of the Workplace Religious FreedomAct, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
249, 249-50 (1999); see infra Part V.D.
151. Although a heavier burden on employers is one consequence of the WRFA, James A.
Sonne argues that employees would invoke the WRFA as a means of proselytizing coworkers and
that such practices would substantially impair an employer's duty to maintain a workplace free
from religious hostility. Sonne, supra note 127, at 1078-79. Employers have consistently opposed
provisions imposing a greater obligation to accommodate upon them. See supratext accompanying
note 83.
152. Joining the ACLU in opposition to the bill are numerous women's groups, including the
National Council of Jewish Women, abortion rights organizations such as Planned Parenthood,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and the American Humanist Association.
Josh Gerstein, Santorum FindsFriendin Kerry, At Least On Religion in Workplace, N.Y. SUN, July
13, 2004, at 1.

A STRUGGLE OF BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS

' These criticisms focus upon the phrase
allowed under current law."153
"religious observance or practice,"'14 which may grant employees the right
to force their beliefs upon others.155 Referencing the ways in which courts
currently handle title VII religious discrimination cases, opponents of the
WRFA maintain that the bill, by modifying twenty-five years of court
reasoning, provides no guarantee that courts would "reverse the outcomes
of the types of cases.., in which an employee was denied a claim to use
his or her religious exercise in a way that would harm critical personal or
civil rights." 56 The ACLU has instead proposed a narrowly drafted version
of the WRFA that would prohibit courts from reaching different outcomes
in most title VII accommodation cases while simultaneously subjecting
employers to a heightened standard for specific types of
' Although two examples are now incorporated into the
accommodations. 57
153. Kevin Eckstrom, Bill Aimed at ProtectingFaith While On the Job; Religious Groups,
ACLU Divided Over Proposal,WASH. POST, May 10, 2003, at B9.
154. S. 893, § 2(b)(2), 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
155. Eckstrom, supra note 153, at B9.
156. ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 6. Christopher Anders, the ACLU's Legislative
Counsel, stated that "[o]ne of the goals of the religious right is to use Title VII to get extra rights
that would harm other people in the workplace... [t]he courts have been telling them no. But if
[this bill] passes, the courts may not be telling them no." Eckstrom, supranote 153. One supporter
of the bill, however, responded that such slippery slope arguments were unfounded: "You can turn
anything into a law school hypothetical... this bill does not obviously allow for those kinds of
things." Id.; see supratext accompanying note 149.
157. ACLU Memo, supranote 144, at 2-3. The "targeted bill," as it has been dubbed, would
increase requirements imposed on employers to accommodate religious employees in only three
areas: scheduling that permits employees to observe religious holidays, allowing employees to wear
certain religious attire, or permitting types of religious grooming (such as a beard, hairstyle, or head
covering). Id. at 3. Opponents of the ACLU approach have likened it to a "Faustian bargain."
WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 10, wherein some claims receive preferential treatment
by imposing the "significant difficulty or expense" standard contained within the WRFA, see S.
893, § 2(a), while other claims would be decided under the preserved de minimis standard for undue
hardship articulated in Hardison.WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 10. Richard T. Foltin
and James D. Standish have written that
[i]f a targeted approach had been taken at the time of drafting the First
Amendment, [it) would be woefully under-inclusive today.... A targeted First
Amendment based on the historic religious accommodation claims coming to
colonial courts and legislatures in the 1700's would likely cover only a narrow
range of Christian beliefs because Native Americans, African Americans and other
minorities, did not generally have access to the Colonial courts. Similarly, a
targeted bill today based on historic claims will ...

eliminate []..

. roughly a

quarter of claims, and this underinclusivity will only expand as the nature of our
religious diversity continues to evolve.
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ACLU's proposed version of the WRFA,5l' nothing in the legislative
record suggests that Congress designed the WRFA to entirely negate
current legal analysis employed by courts in title VII accommodation
cases. 159
B. Will the WRFA Encroach upon the Rights of Minorities?
Incorporated within the belief that the WRFA would motivate courts
to permit claims denied under current law is the contention that third party
individuals' personal and civil rights would be adversely affected. 6 ° In
particular, the ACLU forecasts that homosexuals, as well as religious and
racial minorities, would encounter an increase in discrimination. 61
' Despite
these reservations, the ACLU's concerns have been characterized as "gross
speculation."' 62
1. The Relationship between Accommodation and Discrimination Based
Upon Sexual Orientation under the WRFA
One substantial argument against the WRFA suggests that homosexuals
would be denied the right to nondiscriminatory healthcare and mental
health services.'63 Elevating the undue hardship standard under the WRFA,
it is argued, may resolve conflicts between the religious employee and job
requirements, but it would do so at the expense of homosexual third

Id.at 11. Eliot Spitzer argued that, since "[t]he framers of the First Amendment did not define
religious liberty so narrowly... neither should we." Spitzer, supra note 10, at 7; see also WRFA
Coalition Memo, supranote 9, at 4 ("Civil liberties are indivisible... [R]ights cannot be granted
to some and denied to others." (quoting BriefofAmicus Curiae ACLU Foundation of Oregon, Inc.,
1999 WL 33607004, at *2; Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d
1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 99-35320)).
158. See 118 CONG. REC. S5352 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statement of Sen. Santorum); see
also ACLU Memo, supranote 144, at 10 (referring to the scheduling of religious holidays and the
wearing of religious clothing).
159. See 118 CONG. REC. S5352-53 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statements of Sen. Santorum
and Sen. Kerry).
160. See generally ACLU Memo, supra note 144 (expressing general as well as specific
concerns).
161. Id.at 7-9.
162. WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 3. In fact, Richard T. Foltin and James D.
Standish assert that "[i]t
is untenable to suppose that post-WRFA these same courts - which,
unfortunately, have a history of denying reasonable as well as unreasonable claims for religious
accommodation - will begin finding in favor of the plaintiffs who bring these types of cases." Id.
163. ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 9.
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parties. 64 Under this theory, the WRFA would require employers to
accommodate a religious employee who, because of his faith's rejection
of homosexuality, might feel empowered to harass homosexual coworkers
or refuse to provide services to homosexuals.' 65 Closer consideration of
case law in this area suggests that courts have disposed of claims
potentially impacting homosexuals based upon efficiency considerations
rather than by inquiring into whether an accommodation imposes greater
than de minimis costs to the employer.
The Ninth Circuit, in Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 166 recently
suggested that, regardless of the standard defining an undue hardship to the
employer, courts will not tolerate harassment of homosexuals in the
workplace. 167 The Peterson plaintiff16 posted Biblical scriptures in his
cubicle as a direct response to his employer's display of various "diversity
posters" in the office. 169 Although the plaintiff attempted to resolve the
conflict between his religious beliefs and the employer's
diversity and
70
harassment policies, such efforts were unsuccessful.
The circuit court affirmed summary judgment against the plaintiff
without discussion of the undue hardship standard placed upon the

164. See Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality Lessons from Religion, Disability,
Sexual Orientation,and Transgender,54 ME. L. REV. 159, 178-79 (2002).
165. See ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 6-7, 9.
166. 358 F.3d 599 (9th Cir. 2004).
167. Id. at 606.
168. The plaintiff was a "devout Christian" who believed that he had the duty "to expose evil
when confronted with sin." Id.at 601.
169. Id. In an effort to promote diversity, the employer displayed posters of its employees
above a specific description. Id. Included in these depictions were employees who were of AfricanAmerican and Hispanic descent, an employee with blonde hair, an older employee, and a
homosexual. Id. In response to the diversity poster depicting the homosexual employee, the plaintiff
posted three Biblical passages that were visible to coworkers as well as customers. Id. at 601-02.
One passage the plaintiff displayed stated that: "[i]f a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with
a woman, both of them have committed an abomination; they shall surely be put to death; their
blood shall be put upon them." Id. (quoting Leviticus 20:13).
170. Id.at 602. Several meetings were convened between the plaintiff and his employer. Id.
The plaintiff proposed two options for accommodation: he would remove the scriptural passages
if the employer would remove the poster depicting the homosexual employee or, in the alternative,
he would keep his messages posted so long as the employer continued to display its posters. Id. at
607. Although the employer refused, it nonetheless permitted the plaintiff to take time off with pay
to reconsider his position. Id. at 602. The plaintiff was subsequently terminated for insubordination
when he failed to remove the scriptural passages upon his return to work. Peterson, 358 F.3d at
602.
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employer. 7 ' Rather, the court reasoned that either accommodation
proposed by the plaintiff' 72 would have automatically placed an undue
' Focusing instead upon diversity within the
hardship upon the employer. 73
workplace, the court recognized that exposure to diverse people and
viewpoints were prerequisites to success in "today's increasingly global
marketplace."' 74 Disposition of the case, therefore, hinged upon an
efficiency argument: title VII did not require an employer175to tolerate any
conduct that would negatively impact fellow employees.
The Fifth Circuit utilized an efficiency argument to reach the same
' The plaintiff,
outcome in Bruffv. NorthMississippiHealthServices, Inc. 76
a marriage and family counselor, refused to provide treatment for
homosexual patients because homosexual lifestyles conflicted with her

171. See Peterson, 358 F.3d at 606-08. The court nonetheless assumed arguendo that the
plaintiff established a prima facie case "that his posting of the anti-gay scriptural passages stemmed
from his religious beliefs that homosexual activities 'violate the commandments of God contained
in the Holy Bible."' Id. at 606.
172. See id. at 606-07.
173. Id. at 607. Specifically, each proposed accommodation "would have inhibited [the
employer's] efforts to attract and retain a qualified, diverse workforce, which the company
reasonably views as vital to its commercial success." Id.
174. Id.at 608 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,334 (2003)). For a critique of the
U.S. Supreme Court's view ofdiversity in Grutter,see Robert A. Caplen, Comment, Constitutional
Law: Forecastingthe Sunset of RacialPreferences in HigherEducation While BroadeningTheir
Horizons, 56 FLA. L. REV. 853 (2004).
175. See Peterson, 358 F.3d at 607-08. The court stated:
While Hewlett-Packard must tolerate some degree of employee discomfort in the
process of taking steps required by title VII to correct the wrongs of
discrimination, it need not accept the burdens that would result from allowing
actions that demean or degrade, or are designed to demean or degrade, members
of its workforce.
Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998)); see also Chalmers
v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101 F.3d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1996).
In Chalmers, the Fourth Circuit dismissed a religious accommodation claim brought by a
plaintiffwho wrote religiously motivated and accusatory letters to coworkers. Id.at 1021. The court
recounted how one letter disrupted a business presentation, thereby suggesting the pervasive nature
of the communication and its effect upon the employer's business. Id. at 105-17. The circuit court
reasoned that, "where an employee contends that she has a religious need to impose personally and
directly on fellow employees, invading their privacy and criticizing their personal lives, the
employer is placed between a rock and a hard place." Id.at 1021. Finding that the employer would
subject itself to potential lawsuits if it permitted Chalmers' conduct to continue, the court concluded
that accommodating her posed an undue hardship, regardless of the de minimis standard. See id.
For a discussion on claims involving workplace disruptions, see Brierton, supranote 12, at 182-84.
176. 244 F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2001).

2005]

A STRUGGLE OF BIBLICAL PROPORTIONS

religious faith.' The employer determined that it was unable to
accommodate the plaintiff because counselors were under contract to treat
"a wide variety'.' of psychiatric conditions and could not assess specific
patient care issues until a counseling session commenced." 8 The employer
offered to provide assistance to the plaintiff so that she could secure
another position.'79 The plaintiff subsequently filed a title VII claim and
prevailed at trial i80
The appellate court reversed and noted that an employer could
accommodate a religious employee in one of two ways: modification of
work conditions or transfer to a reasonably comparable position.' The
court determined that, unlike requests that rearrange an employee's
schedule, the plaintiff sought to "not perform some aspects of the position
itself," 82' thereby suggesting that she would only perform "those aspects

177. Id.at 497. The plaintiff requested that she "be excused from... activity helping people
involved in the homosexual lifestyle to have a better relationship with their homosexual partners."
Id. The plaintiff additionally requested that she be excused from counseling any patient who
engaged in a sexual relationship outside of marriage. Id. Although she did not object to counseling
a homosexual individual, the plaintiffnevertheless refused to "provid[e] assistance [to] improve[e]
the homosexual... relationship." Id.
178. Id.at 497-98. The employer notified the plaintiff that it could not permit her to counsel
patients only with respect to topics that did not conflict with her religion due to the following
difficulties:
[Tihe small size of the... staff; the travel and extended hours the counselors must
work; the inability to determine beforehand when a trait or topic might arise that
would require referring the employee to another counselor, thus requiring either
multiple counselors to travel, or scheduling additional counseling sessions at
another time; and the additional sessions that introducing a new counselor might
require to build the trust relationship necessary to be effective.
Id. at 498. The circuit court explained that the plaintiffs requirement that she be "excused from
counseling on any subjects that might conflict with her religious beliefs essentially would give her
unlimited authority to determine what those conflicts [were], and when she must be
accommodated." Id.at 501.
179. Id.at 498. The employer offer the plaintiff an opportunity to take aptitude tests, but the
plaintiff declined to do so. Id. The record also stated that the plaintiff declined to apply for a
different counselor position that became available. Id.
180. Id.at 499.
181. Bruff,244 F.3d at 500. In fact, it was regular practice for counselors at the medical center
at which plaintiff worked to voluntarily accommodate other counselors' preferences. Id.
182. In other words, the court stated that the plaintiffcould not perform the essential functions
of the employment position. See supra text accompanying note 146.
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of the position she found acceptable."' 83 The court acknowledged that
requiring the employer to include multiple counselors for the plaintiffs
sessions would involve an undue hardship that imposed greater than de
minimis costs to the employer' 84 and based its conclusion upon the
logistical and economic impact that accommodating the employee would
have on both the employer and other counselors.'85
Bruffdemonstrates an inherent "conflict of rights" between a religious
86
employee and a homosexual beneficiary of the employee's services.
Specifically, the Bruff court addressed the extent to which an employer
should bear the costs of accommodating a psychiatric counselor based
upon her religious beliefs when those beliefs might pose greater costs to
her homosexual patients.'87 Although the undue hardship standard for
religious discrimination cases was "artificially low" and should be raised
to a "significant difficulty or expense" standard, 8 8 changing the standard
in religious discrimination cases might nonetheless require a reassessment
89
of how such conflicts should be resolved under the WRFA.

183. Bluff, 244 F.3d at 500. The court added that "[n]othing in the record reflects that [the
plaintiff] . . . explored how any such conflicts with her religious beliefs could, in fact, be
accommodated. Id.
184. Id. at 501; see supra text accompanying note 178.
185. Bruff, 244 F.3d at 501. Although the circuit court did not utilize the term "efficiency,"
it is clear from the opinion that requiring additional counselors to accompany the plaintiff into
counseling sessions at the mere chance that a topic objectionable to the plaintiff might arise
constituted a decrease in employment productivity. See id. at 500-01; see supratext accompanying
note 128.
186. Feldblum, supra note 164, at 179.
187. See id. Chai Feldblumn oted that Bruff s patients were "[a]lready sufficiently emotionally
distraught to seek . . . counseling," and that these patients could be adversely affected by
inconsistencies resulting from the use of different therapists. Id.
188. Id.at 179, 184. Feldblum acknowledged, however, that changing the standard by enacting
the WRFA might not necessarily bestow any greater clarification to the law since, under that
standard currently in place under the ADA, "there are no clear, bright-line rules in the law as to
what rises to the level" of significant difficulties or expenses. Id. at 184; Clegg, supra note 143; see
supra text accompanying note 142.
189. See Feldblum, supranote 164, at 179. But see WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at
6 (stating that the dearth of reported cases alleging harassment of homosexuals in the workplace
suggests that, despite the fact that reported cases constitute only a fraction of all cases brought,
attempts to "use Title VII to protect those involved in harassment of gays in the workplace are not
[an] endemic problem" and that the WRFA would not affect this trend).
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2. The Relationship Between Accommodations and Their Effects Upon
Racial and Religious Minorities Under the WRFA
Courts that denied accommodations for employees whose requested
accommodations might have had an adverse impact upon religious and
racial minorities have not reached the undue hardship standard the WRFA
seeks to amend. Courts have typically disposed of these cases in one of
three ways. First, courts examine whether the plaintiff has stated a prima
facie case for religious discrimination.' 9" In cases where plaintiffs satisfied
this initial burden, courts have invoked efficiency arguments,
Establishment Clause concerns, or Philbrook to justify denying plaintiff
relief. The following cases demonstrate how courts consistently refuse to
impose an obligation upon employers to accommodate employees when
doing so would adversely affect others with or for whom the employee
works.
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected claims that would require
employers to provide accommodations that might potentially offend racial
minorities. For example, the plaintiff in Schwartzentruber v. Gunite
Corp.'9' filed a title VII claim against his employer after the employer
required him to cover a tattoo depicting a hooded Ku Klux Klan member
standing before a burning cross.' 92 Although the employer permitted the
plaintiff to expose the tattoo only at a wash basin, management maintained
that the plaintiff never represented that the tattoo "was religious in nature
or that his religious beliefs required him to display [it]."' 93 Thus, the
district court determined that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie
case 194 of religious discrimination without even reaching an inquiry into
190. See infra text accompanying note 194.
191. 99 F. Supp. 2d 976 (N.D. Ind. 2000).
192. Id. at 979. The plaintiff asserted that he was a member of the Church of the American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and that his tattoo depicted several sacred symbols. Id. For a further
discussion of this case, see Jennifer Fowler-Hermes, Labor andEmployment Law: The Beauty and
the Beast in the Workplace: Appearance-BasedDiscriminationClaims UnderEEO Laws, 75 FLA.
B.J. 32, 35-36 (2001).
193. Schwartzentruber,99 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
194. Id.at 979. In order to survive summary judgment on a religious discrimination claim
alleging failure to accommodate, an employee must first establish that 1) he had a bona fide
religious belief that conflicts with an employment requirement; 2) he informed his employer of
such belief; and 3) he was discharged for failure to comply with the conflicting employment
requirements. See supra text accompanying note 107; see also Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co.,
358 F.3d 599, 606 (9th Cir. 2004); Jones v. TEK Indus., 319 F.3d 355,359 (8th Cir. 2003); Cosme
v. Henderson, 287 F.3d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de
Acueductos y Alcantarillados de P.R., 279 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2002); Virts v. Consol. Freightways
Corp., 285 F.3d 508, 516 (6th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. U.S.F. Logistics (ICM), Inc., 274 F.3d 470,
478 (7th Cir. 2001); Daniels v. City of Arlington, 246 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2001); Thomas v.
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undue hardship.' 95 The court further noted that a claimant must
demonstrate that any verbal or physical harassment encountered in the
workplace must "be because of a religious belief,"' 9 6 not merely
membership in or association with an organization.
The Seventh Circuit utilized an efficiency argument and decrease in
employee productivity in order to reject a title VII claim brought by a
chaplain'97 dismissed for failure to separate religious doctrines from
medical treatment in Baz v. Walters.198 Although the circuit court noted
that the employer met its burden by demonstrating that accommodating the
plaintiff would constitute a hardship,' 99 it focused upon the ramifications
of accommodation with respect to a decrease in employment
productivity.2 °° Thus, the court concluded that a decrease in an employee's
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1155 (10th Cir. 2000); Shelton v. Univ. of Med. &
Dentistry of N.J., 223 F.3d 220, 224 (3d Cir. 2000).
195. Schwartzentruber, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 979. This conclusion was reached on two grounds.
First, the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence suggesting that covering his tattoo conflicted with
his religious beliefs. Id. Secondly, regardless of whether covering the tattoo violated the plaintiff's
religious convictions, his employer offered a reasonable accommodation, thereby ending the
inquiry. Id.
196. Id.at 980. The court stated that such harassment must be "'so severe or pervasive' as to
'alter the conditions of... employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,786 (1998)). In Schwartzentruber,the plaintiff bore
the burden of proving that his workplace was replete with discriminatory conduct that significantly
affected his employment by introducing evidence related to "the frequency, severity and threatening
or humiliating nature of the discriminatory conduct and whether it unreasonably interferes with his
work performance." Id.Since he could not substantiate that the harassment he encountered was due
to his religious beliefs and not his membership in the Ku Klux Klan, the plaintiff did not satisfy his
burden and his claim failed. Id. at 980-8 1. For a further discussion of cases involving instances of
religious expression as harassment, see Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 123, at 615-21.
197. Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 702 (7th Cir. 1986). The Baz plaintiff was ordained a
minister of the Assemblies of God Church and, despite lacking required three-year, post-graduate
parish ministry experience, gained employment with a Veterans Administration Medical Center.
Id.
198. Id.at 703-04. The plaintiff, in addition to having difficulties "in the discharge of his
duties," conducted musical evenings with patients during which, according to a Chief of Chaplains,
the plaintiff modified the "format of the event to a Christian evangelical service." Id. at 703.
199. Id.at 706. The court emphasized that the employer "need only show that it would be a
hardship to accommodate [plaintiff's] theology in view of their established theory and practice."
Id.
200. Id.at 707. The circuit court concluded:
To accommodate Reverend Baz's religious practices, [the hospital] would have
to either adopt his philosophy of patient care, expend resources on continually
checking up on what Reverend Baz was doing[,] or stand by while he practices his
(in their view, damaging) ministry in their facility. None of these is an
accommodation required by Title VII.
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efficiency, regardless of de minimis cost to the employer, constituted an
undue hardship.2" 1
A second case with similar facts to Baz was decided on constitutional
grounds. The plaintiff in Spratt v. County of Kent,2"2 a county social
worker, initiated a title VII claim based upon his termination for
insubordination after he refused to cease incorporating religious doctrines
into counseling sessions with prison inmates. 23 The district court
concluded that the county had "very limited" flexibility to accommodate 204
the plaintiff since the Establishment Clause imposed an obligation upon
the county to maintain a neutral position on religion. 20 5 Although the court
noted that Hardisondid not require an employer to incur greater than a de
minimis cost, the standard was not dispositive to the case.20 6

Id.
201. See id. at 706-07; Kaminer, supra note 28, at 614 (stating that courts have "consistently
concluded that employers are not required to incur any ... cost in terms of lost efficiency in
accommodating a religious employee"); see supra text accompanying note 128.
202. 621 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Mich. 1985), af'd,810 F.2d 203 (6th Cir. 1986).
203. Id.at 596-98. The plaintiff, a Pentecostal Christian, characterized himself as an evangelist
assigned the task of spreading the Gospel "whenever the opportunity presents itself." Id.at 596. The
Spratt court noted that the plaintiff, while assigned to the county jail as a counselor, incorporated
a technique described as "treatment by spiritual means," which permitted "the spirit of God to
administer.., both the counselor and counselee. Among the specific techniques used by plaintiff
were Bible reading, prayer, addressing spiritual issues, and, in at least one instance, the 'casting out
of demons."' Id. The plaintiff was discharged after several instructions not to "intermix" religious
elements into psychological counseling since the former was only within the purview of prison
chaplains. Id. at 597. Prior to his discharge, the plaintiff attempted to amend his job description so
that "counseling by spiritual means" was incorporated into his position and sought to recommend
that the county purchase malpractice insurance as a way to insulate itself "from the liability that
might arise if an inmate sued the County because of plaintiff's counseling methods." Spratt, 621
F. Supp. at 597.
204. Id. at 600. The Spratt court acknowledged that the county sought to reasonably
accommodate the plaintiff numerous times and sought legal advice to determine whether an
accommodation could be achieved. Id.
205. Id. The Sprattcourt recognized that "plaintiff's free exercise rights must be limited to the
extent that his conduct would infringe upon the establishment clause or constitutional rights of
others." Id. at 601.
206. Id. at 600. In fact, the court relied instead upon efficiency arguments articulated by the
Baz court. Id.; see also Knight v. State of Conn. Dep't of Pub. Health, 275 F.3d 156, 167-68 (2d
Cir. 2001) (finding that a nurse and sign language interpreter, both of whom used religious
references in the course of treatment, "jeopardize[d] the state's ability to provide services in a
religion-neutral manner" without addressing greater than de minimis hardship). See supra text
accompanying notes 128, 199-201.
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Some courts have entirely avoided an inquiry into greater than de
2 °7 in order to preclude
minimis hardship by relying upon Philbrook
recovery in instances where an employer provided more than a reasonable
accommodation to the employee.2"8 Courts have rejected claims involving
religious invocations 0 9 without discussion of greater than de minimis
hardship2" ° and have reaffirmed a religious employee's obligation to
cooperate with the employer's efforts to implement a reasonable
accommodation.' In addition to imposing a duty upon the religious
employee to cooperate with the employer, the employee must also
demonstrate that a particular practice comprises part of the employee's
religious beliefs.212 Thus, courts have decided cases involving religious
207. One such case is Anderson v. US.F.Logistics (1CM), Inc. 274 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2001).
The plaintiff, a member of the Christian Methodist Episcopal faith, used the phrase "Have a Blessed
Day" both verbally and in written communication as an expression of her faith. Id. at 473. When
a fellow employee complained about the plaintiff's use of the phrase to the employer, the plaintiff
maintained that "it was her religious expression" and would only refrain from speaking the phrase
if the employer identified those coworkers who were offended. Id.
The circuit court cited Philbrookfor the proposition that a reasonable accommodation must
eliminate the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices and determined
that enabling the plaintiff to use the phrase with some people but not everyone "could be a
reasonable accommodation." Id. at 475-76. In fact, the employer permitted the plaintiff to "use the
'Blessed Day' phrase with coworkers, to hang objects containing various religious phrases in her
work area, to read the Bible on her work break, and to listen to a religiously oriented radio station
at her work station." Id. at 477. These accommodations, the court concluded, satisfied the
employer's obligations under title VII. Anderson, 274 F.3d at 477.
208. See, e.g., id. at 475-77.
209. See, e.g., Johnson v. Halls Merch., No. 87-1042-CV-W-9, 1989 WL 23201, at *2 (W.D.
Mo. 1989). The plaintiff in Johnson utilized the invocation "In the name of Jesus Christ of
Nazareth" to preface each sentence while working for a retail employer. Id. at *2.
210. Id.
211. Id. The court noted that the employer had a legitimate interest in operating its business
in a manner that did not offend the religious beliefs of its customers. Id. At the same time, however,
the court implied that the employee had an affirmative duty to cooperate with the employer in its
efforts to make a reasonable accommodation and, absent that showing, a title VII claim failed. See
id; see also Buonanno v. AT&T Broadband, LLC, 313 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1080 (D. Colo. 2004)
(citing Philbrookfor the proposition that both employer and employee have reciprocal duties to
discuss and attempt to reach a reasonable accommodation).
212. See supratext accompanying notes 194-95. The Eighth Circuit addressed the scope of
an employee's religious belief. Wilson v. U.S. W. Communications, 58 F.3d 1337, 1341-42 (8th
Cir. 1995). The plaintiff in Wilson alleged that she was a "living witness" who, as part of her
Roman Catholic religious vow, was compelled to wear an antiabortion button. Id. at 1339. The
plaintiff believed that she was "an instrument of God like the Virgin Mary" and therefore wore a
visually descriptive antiabortion pin to work. Id. The button caused disruptions at work, and
coworkers found it "offensive and disturbing." Id. When coworkers threatened to walk off their
jobs, the employer informed the plaintiff that she could either wear the button in her cubicle or
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minorities213 on grounds unrelated to the Hardison standard of undue
hardship, which suggests that enacting the WRFA would have little or no
effect upon either the legal reasoning employed by the courts or the
ultimate outcome.214
cover the button. Id. After coworkers filed grievances, the employer required that the plaintiff not
display "anything depicting a fetus." Wilson, 58 F.3d at 1339.
The reviewing court affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff's vow was not part
of her religious beliefs: "[T]here is evidence that Wilson's vow did not always include the
requirement that she be a living witness. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Wilson first mentioned
the living witness requirement only after her supervisor suggested that she cover the button." Id.
at 1341. Since the plaintiff's religious vow did not require that she wear the button, the circuit court
concluded that the employer offered a reasonable accommodation by permitting her to keep her
vow by wearing the button in her cubicle. Id. at 1342. Since the employer offered a reasonable
accommodation, the circuit court found that the inquiry ended and it therefore did not reach
whether the employer incurred an undue hardship. Id. Additionally, the circuit court invoked an
efficiency argument by noting that a disruption at work constituted an undue hardship. Id. at 1342
n.3; see supratext accompanying notes 200, 206. For a further discussion on the Wilson case, see
Beiner & DiPippa, supra note 123, at 602-05.
213. See, e.g., Kaushal v. Hyatt Regency Woodfield, No. 98C4834, 1999 WL 436585, at *1,
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1999); see infra text accompanying note 214.
214. See Kaushal, 1999 WL 436585, at *3. Kaushalserves as a paradigm for courts disposing
of claims that would offend third parties. The plaintiff in Kaushal sprayed a swastika on hotel
mirrors for religious good luck measures without first notifying his employer. Id. at *1. Since the
plaintiff never informed his employer that he intended to display the symbol, the court found that
he failed to establish a prima facie case. Id. at *3; see supra text accompanying note 194. The court
stated arguendo that, even had the employee established a prima facie case, his claim still would
have failed:
[I]t is absurd to argue that [plaintiff's] behavior was susceptible of
accommodation. While the swastika may have a revered place in the religious
world.., it is also one of the most offensive and condemned symbols in much of
the United States and the western world. Indeed, the swastika is so offensive to
many that its public display.., is unthinkable.
Kaushal, 1999 WL 436585, at *3. For additional cases involving religious minorities that were
adjudicated on grounds unrelated to the de minimis standard, see Virts v. Consol. Freightways Corp.
of Del., 285 F.3d 508 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a plaintiff, who objected to completing "sleeper
run" shifts with female coworkers in violation of religious beliefs proscribing travel with women
failed to request accommodations from the employer and sought accommodation for the first time
in his motion for partial summaryjudgment claim); Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270
(5th Cir. 2000) (denying relief to an employee who refused to make long-haul overnight trips with
female coworkers because inflexible religious exceptions affecting scheduling preferences
constituted an undue hardship); Miller v. Drennon, No. 3:89-1466-0, 1991 WL 325291 (D.S.C.
June 13, 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1443 (4th Cir. 1992) (denying a plaintiff who objected to particular
sleeping arrangements with female coworkers denied claim after employer provided reasonable
accommodation which included the use of folding walls, alternative sleeping arrangements, and
voluntary work switch shifts).
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C. Will the WRFA Deny PatientsAccess to Reproductive Healthcare?
Concerns about the dynamic between an individual's religious practices
and rights to reproductive healthcare were highlighted this past spring
when a customer who sought to refill her birth control pill prescription at
a local CVS Pharmacy in Texas was turned away by a pharmacist who
refused to provide the prescription.215 The scenario in Texas was not an
anomaly. In fact, the American Center for Law and Justice filed lawsuits
on behalf of discharged pharmacists who refused to dispense "morningafter" pills to customers in Ohio and California over the past several
years.216 Opponents of the WRFA suggest that these instances would
become commonplace rather than the exception when the WRFA becomes
law and would extend to hospital nurses who refuse to perform emergency
abortions.21 Several courts have denied title VII claims brought by
employees who refused to provide reproductive services that violated their
religious beliefs. In each instance, courts have based their judgments upon
health and public safety concerns rather than on a particular standard
2 8
defining which costs reach the level of imposing undue hardships.
215. See Press Release, Planned Parenthood, Planned Parenthood Demands CVS Action on
Birth Control Prescriptions (Mar. 31, 2004), available at http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
pp2/portal/files/portal/media/pressreleases/pr-04033 1-birth-control-CVS.xml (lastvisited May 19,
2005). According to Planned Parenthood, the pharmacist refused to fill the prescription based solely
upon a personal religious belief disavowing birth control. See id. Apparently as a result of
confusion within the company, a CVS spokesman initially and erroneously maintained that CVS
supported a pharmacist's refusal to fill a prescription based upon the employee's personal beliefs.
See id.; WRFA Coalition Memo, supranote 9, at 7. Later, CVS confirmed that such actions by its
pharmacists violated company policy, and "a pharmacist who refuse[d] to dispense medication
based on personal ideology must make sure that the patient's prescription is filled anyway, either
by another pharmacist at that location or by another pharmacy in the area." Id.
216. ACLJ Gets Legal Victory as Lawsuit Against Kmart Involving Abortion Producing Drugs
Moves Forward, ACLJ Task Force (Jan. 24, 2001), available at http://www.acljlife.org/news/
nr_010124babortiondrugs.asp (last visited Jan. 26, 2005); ACLJ Wins Religious Discrimination
Case Over "Morning-After" Pill, ACLJ Pro-Life Task Force (May 29, 2002), available at http://
www.acljlife.org/news/abortion/020529_acljwins-momingafter_ suit.asp (last visited Jan. 26,
2005); see also Press Release, Planned Parenthood, supra note 215 (stating that an Eckerd
pharmacist in Texas who refused to fill a rape survivor's prescription for emergency contraception
was discharged).
217. See ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 6-7, 9; infra text accompanying notes 219-48.
218. See WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 8. Current case law suggests that there is
"no reasonable basis to conclude that WRFA is likely to lead to any material change in how these
cases are resolved. The courts ... do not hang their analysis.., on the de minimis standard." Id.;
see also Kaminer, supra note 28, at 616 (stating that "courts have almost unanimously determined
that employers are not required to accommodate religious employees in a manner that would result
in health or safety hazards").
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In Shelton v. University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey,"t 9 the

Third Circuit denied a title VII claim filed by a nurse who refused to
provide medical treatments that violated her religious beliefs to patients
requiring emergency procedures.2 2 The nurse refused to participate in

medical procedures involving two women: the first patient suffered from
a ruptured membrane requiring induced labor, while the second was
diagnosed with placenta previa 22 ' Shortly after these incidents, the
hospital notified the nurse that she could no longer work in the Labor and
Delivery section based upon her refusal to participate in essential
healthcare that "save[d] the life of the mother and/or child." 2 The hospital

offered the nurse a lateral transfer into another department and referred her
to its human resources department to secure another nursing position.223224
The circuit court noted that the nurse established a prima facie case;
however, it concluded that the hospital provided her with at least two
reasonable accommodations. 2 5 Stressing the dual responsibilities of an
219. 223 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 2000).
220. Id.at 222. The nurse, a member of the Pentecostal faith, maintained that her faith
precluded her from engaging "directly or indirectly in ending a life." Id. Although the nurse had
informed the hospital of her beliefs, the hospital requested that she submit a letter from her pastor
articulating her faith's beliefs after she refused to participate in a medical procedure. Id. at 223.
Instead, the nurse supplied her own note which stated that
[b]efore the foundations of the earth, God called me to be Holy. For this cause I
must be obedient to the word of God. From his own mouth he said "Thou shalt not
kill." Therefore, regardless of the situation, I will not participate directly or
indirectly in ending a life.
Id.
221. Id. at 222-23. Placenta previa, the condition from which the first patient suffered, results
when the fetus's placenta completely covers the mother's cervix, potentially causing blood loss.
Id.at 223 n.3. When physicians ordered the use of oxytocin on this patient, the nurse refused,
stating that she would not participate in any medical procedure utilizing oxytocin on a preterm
pregnancy. Id. at 222-23. The second patient was "standing in a pool of blood" and her condition
was life-threatening. Id. at 223. After physicians determined that an emergency cesarean section
delivery was necessary, the nurse refused to participate in the procedure. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 223.
As a result, the emergency procedure was delayed for thirty minutes until another nurse could be
procured. Id.
222. Id. The hospital maintained that the nurse's refusal to participate in these medical
procedures jeopardized patients' health and safety. Id.
223. Id. The nurse characterized these options as an "ultimatum" that did not "align with the
response I am unctioned to submit." Id. The record suggests that the nurse did not accept a position
in the Newborn Intensive Care Unit or apply for different nursing positions. Id. at 223-24. The
hospital subsequently terminated her. Id. at 224.
224. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 225; see supra text accompanying note 194.
225. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 226-27.
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employer and employee to discuss the reasonableness of an
accommodation, the court noted that the nurse failed to satisfy her duty.2 26
As a result, the nurse's refusal to cooperate "undermine[d] the cooperative
approach to religious accommodation issues that Congress intended to
foster." 2 7 As such, the court rejected the notion that a hospital was
required to sacrifice its healthcare services in an effort to accommodate a
nurse's religious convictions.228
The district court in Grant v. Fairview Hospital & Healthcare
Services2 29 rejected a title VII claim by an ultrasound technician who
sought to dissuade patients from having abortions.23 ° During ultrasound
procedures, the technician would pray with the patient and offer to involve
his pastor as a counselor.23 ' The court relied solely upon the employer's
requirement to "reasonably accommodate" a religious employee and never
addressed greater than de minimis costs that constituted an undue
hardship.232 Although the hospital did not pose an efficiency argument, the
court nonetheless cited Wilson2 33 for the proposition that employers need
'
not allow employees "to impose their religious views upon others."234

226. Id. at 227. The court noted that"[o]nce the Hospital initiated discussions... Shelton had
a duty to cooperate in determining whether the proposal was a reasonable one. Id. Quoting
Philbrook,the court added: "[C]ourts have noted that 'bilateral cooperation is appropriate in the
search for an acceptable reconciliation of the needs of the employee's religion and the exigencies
of the employer's business."' Id.; see supratext accompanying note 211.
227. Shelton, 223 F.3d at 228.
228. See WRFA Coalition Memo, supranote 9, at 6-7.
229. Civ. No. 02-4232 (JNE/JGL), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653 (D. Minn. Feb. 18, 2004).
230. Id. at *16. The technician asserted that his religious belief "requires him to counsel
women out of having abortions." Id. at *2.
231. Id. at *3.The hospital administration explained that the technician's offers to provide
pastoral counseling were beyond the scope of his responsibilities but accomodated him by assigning
another technician to ultrasound examinations on women contemplating abortions. Id. at *3-*4.The
administration advised the technician that he could cease treatment on any patients who sought an
abortion; however, the technician insisted on continuing treatment since "his belief required him
to try to dissuade a woman from having an abortion, even if that meant losing his job." Id.at *4.
He was subsequently discharged. Id.
232. The court noted that the "statute and case law require Fairview to 'reasonably
accommodate' Grant, not 'accommodate' Grant." Id. at *16. Moreover, the district court
specifically addressed potential harms to third parties by recognizing that the hospital could not
control the content of confidential information disclosed between patient and physicians or
ultrasound technicians. Id. at * 15. By allowing the technician to provide religious counseling to his
patients, the hospital would be required "to accept the risk that [the technician's] religious belief
may require him to provide unauthorized pastoral care to patients in the future. Fairview is under
no obligation to accept such a risk with respect to third parties to whom it owes a duty of care." Id.
233. See supratext accompanying note 212.
234. Grant, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2653, at *16.
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A second line of cases involve police officers who refused to protect
abortion clinics due to their religious convictions.235 In Rodriguez, a police
officer informed his superiors that he opposed guarding abortion clinics
based upon his religious convictions.236 Although the department would
"try not to assign" abortion clinic watches to the officer, it could not
formally excuse him from such duties.237 The circuit court denied the
officer's title VII claim after the department offered to transfer him to a
district without an abortion clinic, an accommodation that would have
removed the conflict between the officer's duties and his religious
beliefs.238 Judge Posner, in a separate concurrence, emphasized that the
case exemplified the paramount importance of ensuring public safety:
It is undue hardship in spades when the necessary accommodation
would strike a body blow to the employer's business. When the
business of the employer is to protect the public safety, the
maintenance of public confidence in the neutrality of the protectors
is central to effective performance, and the erosion of that
confidence by recognition of a right of recusal by public-safety
officers so undermines the agency's effective performance as to
constitute an undue hardship within the meaning of the statute.2 39
Judge Posner added that the work of police and fire departments was of
such importance that both should be able to invoke undue hardship to
"escape any duty of accommodation. '
The police officer in Parrott refused to arrest antiabortion
demonstrators engaged in "rescue missions" outside of reproductive rights
" ' After receiving a suspension with pay, the officer filed a title VII
clinics.24
235. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. City of Chicago, 156 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 1998); Parrott v. District
of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 91-0049, 1991 WL 126020 (D.D.C. June 25, 1991).
236. Rodriguez, 156 F.3d at 773-74. The officer, a devout Roman Catholic, believed that "an
elective abortion is the wrongful taking of innocent human life and that individuals have a general
moral obligation to avoid participating in, or facilitating, an elective abortion." Id. at 773.
237. Id. The officer received an assignment to replace another clinic guard and served in such
a capacity under protest. Id. at 774. The officer subsequently resorted to using vacation time,
obtaining out-of-district assignments, and other available means to avoid further abortion clinic
assignments. Id.
238. Id. at 778.
239. Id. at 779-80 (Posner, J., concurring).
240. Id. at 779 (Posner, J., concurring).
241. Parrott v. District of Columbia, Civ. A. No. 91-0049, 1991 WL 126020, at *2 (D.D.C.
June 25, 1991). The officer informed his department that he would not direct other officers to arrest
demonstrators engaging in rescue missions and would "go to jail himself rather than arrest" them.
Id. The officer prefaced these convictions on the belief that "[e]ach individual must judge for
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claim against his department.2" 2 Although the Parrottcourt determined
that providing a reasonable accommodation to the officer would constitute
a greater than de minimis cost, it implied that the hardship placed upon a
police department significantly exceeded de minimis costs. 24 3 The court
substantiated its ruling upon the fact that uniformity and discipline on a
police force were paramount to ensuring that all officers enforced the
law. 24
Rodriguez and Parrottprovide, in no uncertain terms, that police
officers who refused to protect individuals seeking access to abortion
clinics posed substantial and undue hardships upon law enforcement.
Although these cases dealt specifically with the health and safety concerns
of the public at large, other courts have similarly refused to require that
employers create conditions compromising health or safety standards in
order to accommodate a religious employee within their businesses.
Additional examples include employees who wore certain religious head
coverings s4 or maintained particular facial grooming practices based upon
their faith.2 46 Courts, therefore, have continually denied accommodation
themselves whether a governing authority is binding... or abolished by the power of the Spirit."
Id.
242. Id.
243. See id.at *3.
244. Id.The court stated that the Chief of Police was "under a mandate" to secure
"unquestioned loyalty" and "strict obedience" from members of the force and that such traits are
"required for the orderly and efficient operation of police business." Id. The court added:
If all officers were permitted . . . to abstain from enforcing laws which they
believed were inappropriate, it would be impossible for the [police department]
to organize its forces and to guarantee that there would be a sufficient number of
officers at any given moment to enforce any given law. The dependability of the
police force would be destroyed. It is a police officer's duty to uphold the law
which has been passed by the people in order to protect society... until such time
as [the laws] do change, however, it is his duty as a law enforcement officer to
protect individuals inside abortion clinics from others' interference with their
legally protected rights.
Id.
245. See, e.g., Kalsi v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 62 F. Supp. 2d 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1998), aff'd,
189 F.3d 461 (2d Cir. 1999). The plaintiff, a Sikh employee, refused to wear a hardhat that would
cover his turban in violation of his faith. Id.at 748, 750. The court reasoned that, where any
proposed religious accommodation threatened to compromise safety in the workplace, the
employer's burden of establishing an undue hardship was "light indeed." Id.at 758. The court
concluded that permitting the employee to work without a hardhat not only subjected the employee
to injury but those around him could have been similarly injured. Id.at 760.
246. See, e.g., Bhatia v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 734 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1984). In Bhatia,the
Ninth Circuit denied a Sikh employee's claim for religious discrimination after he was fired for
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claims that potentially undermine the "important societal goal" of
maintaining health and safety. 247 As a result, any accommodation that
might compromise individuals' health or safety, including those involving
been found to constitute substantially
reproductive rights, has continually
248
cost.
minimis
de
than
greater
D. Does the WRFA Violate the Establishment Clause
of the U.S. Constitution?
While proponents maintain that "it stretches credulity" to suggest that
the WRFA would prompt courts to abandon twenty-five years of legal
reasoning,249 they must also simultaneously respond to concerns that the
bill is unconstitutional. 5 ° Proponents of the WRFA, including
congressional cosponsors of the bill, find no inconsistencies between the
bill and the Establishment Clause of the Constitution. 25' The version of the
WRFA introduced during the 106th Congress, however, overburdened
employers by placing economic and secular concerns below religious
interests in violation of the Establishment Clause. 2 Another critic of the
WRFA maintained that Congress, by heightening employers'
accommodation duties, will exceed its authority by going "too far beyond
the demands of the Free Exercise Clause to be considered
appropriate ... legislation. ,253

refusing to shave his beard, because it interfered with the use of a gas-tight respirator. Id. at 1383.
While the court acknowledged that the employer offered reasonable accommodations to the
employee, retaining him to work as a machinist with a beard that potentially interfered with the
proper use of a respirator created an undue hardship. Id. Furthermore, the circuit court suggested
that accommodating the religious employee could expose other employees to toxic gases or
hazardous working conditions. Id. at 1384.
247. Kaminer, supra note 28, at 616.
248. See id.
249. WRFA Coalition Memo, supranote 9, at 6-7.
250. See infra text accompanying notes 252-53.
251. The First Amendment states, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST.
amend I.; see 149 CONG. REc. S5352-53, (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2003) (statements of Sen. Santorum
and Sen. Kerry); Foltin Testimony, supra note 124, at 40 (arguing that the WRFA is wholly
consistent with the Establishment Clause's requirement that government not prescribe religious
preferences).
252. Gawlik, supra note 150, at 250-51; see also Kent Greenawalt, Title VII and Religious
Liberty, 33 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 1, 22 (2001) ("Enough cases have been decided since Hardisonto
give us reasonable assurance that requiring minimal cost accommodation is constitutionally
permissible. But, that conclusion leaves open the issue of whether requiring more costly
accommodations might violate the Establishment Clause.").
253. Oleske, supranote 133, at 537. Nonetheless, because the burden imposed upon employers
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Although Hardison did not explicitly address Establishment Clause
concerns, the majority concluded that the "repeated, unequivocal
emphasis" of title VII was to eliminate discrimination in employment and
proscribe unequal treatment." 4 Justice Marshall found no constitutional
problem with title VII and noted that any religious practitioner was
protected.255 In fact, 256numerous courts have rejected constitutional
challenges to title VII.
Proponents of the WRFA note that the Supreme Court has
distinguished between reasonable and absolute religious accommodations.
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,25 7 the Court found that a state statute
guaranteeing workers a right to a day off on their respective Sabbaths
violated the Establishment Clause.258 Justice O'Connor, in a separate
concurrence joined by Justice Marshall, noted that title VII provisions
"manifest a valid secular purpose and effect" and conform with the

was "far from onerous," the WRFA is both "congruent and proportional to the requirements of the
Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 568; see also Gawlik, supra note 150, at 260-61 (stating that any
future amendment to title VII resembling the WRFA "faces serious challenges on Establishment
Clause grounds").
254. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 81 (1977).
255. Id. at 90 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall stated that:
The purpose and primary effect. .. is the wholly secular one of securing equal
economic opportunity to members of minority religions ... the mere fact that the
law sometimes requires special treatment of religion practitioners does not present
the dangers of "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the
sovereign in religious activity," against which the Establishment Clause is
principally aimed.
Id. at 90 n.4 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
256. See, e.g., EEOC v. Ithaca Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 119 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Protos v. Volkswagen ofAm., Inc., 797 F.2d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 972; McDaniel v. Essex Int'l Inc., 696 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir. 1982); see also
Corrada Testimony, supranote 142, at 57 ("Title VII has been interpreted to protect against both
discrimination against and in favor of religion ... [T]he circuit court decisions interpreting Title
VII . . . are key to [the WRFA's] survival under the Constitution."); see supra 251 and
accompanying text.
257. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
258. Id. at 710-11. The Court concluded that the statute imposed an absolute duty "to
conform... business practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing
observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates." Id. at 709. Since the statute failed
to consider the interests of the employer or other employees not observing a particular Sabbath, it
"impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious practice" in violation of the First Amendment. Id.
at 710.
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Establishment Clause. 259 The statute in question in Thornton, much like the
inadvertent Blue Laws debacle in Virginia, is distinguishable from the
WRFA, which balances both the needs of the religious employee and the
concerns of the employer. 260 As such, proponents of the WRFA maintain
that it survives constitutional scrutiny because it merely clarifies
provisions in title VII and neither prescribes absolute religious
accommodation261
nor imposes a given religious practice upon employers
employees.
and
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Workplace Religious Freedom Act affirms an employer's
obligation to reasonably accommodate a religious employee unless doing
so would cause significant difficulty or expense.262 The proposed
legislation encourages greater participation between employers and
employees in determining how to achieve a reasonable accommodation
that removes the conflict between employment requirements and the
employee's religious observance or practice.263 The WRFA strikes an
appropriate balance between protecting religious liberty and reconciling
faith within the workplace 2 ' and serves to restore the original intent of
title VII protections for religious employees. 265 As workplace religious
diversity increases, 266 and concerns over discrimination continue to

259. Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor further noted that title VII was
designed to provide reasonable as opposed to absolute accommodation and that its provisions
extended "to all religious beliefs and practices." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
260. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text.
261. See Foltin Testimony, supra note 124, at 41 ("A constitutional analysis that would place
WRFA in doubt... could cast a significant shadow over all of Title VII, as well as other civil rights
legislation of long standing."); see also Foltin and Standish, supra note 13.
262. See S. 893, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003).
263. See id.; Brierton, supra note 12, at 192 ("Working with employees to reach an equitable
resolution from the employee's perspective fulfills the intent behind reasonable accommodation
provisions and accords significance to the religious beliefs of the employee.").
264. See The Workplace Religious Freedom Act: Hearing on S.1124 Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997) (testimony of Sen. John
Kerry).
265. See id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Daniel R. Coats).
266. See Christopher S. Stewart, Office Politics andGod, SALON.COM, Apr. 17, 2003 (citing
that a Tanenbaum Center for Interreligious Understanding survey concluded that thirty-six percent
of U.S. workplaces had an increase in religious diversity over the previous five years), available
at http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/04/17/workplace-religion/indexnp.html (last visited
May 19, 2005).
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permeate American society since September 11, 2001, such legislation is
necessary to preserve religious freedom in the American workplace.26 7
Despite these laudable objectives, the WRFA has encountered
opposition questioning its constitutionality and illuminating the potential
adverse effects the bill might impose upon third parties. 268 The concerns
raised by organizations opposed to the WRFA 269 are grounded in a theory
that the bill would enable courts to depart from commonsense reasoning
and precedent in order to reinterpret title VII religious accommodation
law. 27 ° Such concerns, however, are merely hypothetical.2 In each case
advanced to justify opposition to the WRFA, the plaintiff failed to prevail
under a title VII religious accommodation claim.272
The long-standing history of the bill and its omnipresence in Congress
since 1994273 suggests congressional ambivalence to modify twenty-five
years of title VII statutory construction.274 Recent attempts to advance the
WRFA through Congress were dim - especially during an election year
with Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry as a principal
cosponsor.2" Nonetheless, the next Congress should seize upon the
opportunity to offer religious employees meaningful protection within the
American workplace. Once enacted, the WRFA will represent "another
milestone in civil rights. 276

267. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
268. See supra Part V.
269. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
270. See supra Part V.A.
271. See supra text accompanying note 156.
272. ACLU Memo, supra note 144, at 6-7; WRFA Coalition Memo, supra note 9, at 2.
273. See supra Parts III.B., IV.
274. The WRFA is "a vehicle by which Congress can demonstrate that its frequent tributes to
religion are not mere rhetoric but evidence of the abiding values that America's laws must promote
and protect." Diament, supra note 133.
275. See, e.g., LegislationAhead in 2004, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2004 ("After early spring,
it becomes increasingly difficult to pass legislation during an election year); G. Robert Hillman,
Bush's ImmigrationPlan CouldAlter Social, PoliticalLandscape;Election-yearProposalSparks
Vigorous Debate, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004, at 1A (noting that controversial
legislation "will have a difficult time" passing in Congress during an election year); Carl Hulse, A
FrustratedCongress Takes a Break, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2004, at A9 (noting that lawmakers are
more concerned about politics than productivity during an election year and stating that "[n]othing
ever passes in [an election year] except a motion to adjourn."); Bill Loveless, SenateLeaderof Last
Big Energy Bill Sees TimeforAnother One Next Year, INSIDE ENERGY WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Dec.
1,2003, at 3 ("Election years always make it a lot more difficult to pass bills.., when you get past
February and March, all bets are off.").
276. Foltin & Standish, supra note 2, at 24.

